

THE AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW

VOL. CXXXII, No. 2

FEBRUARY, 1955

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Published monthly by The Catholic University of America Press, Washington 17, D. C. Subscription price in U. S. currency or equivalent: United States, Canada, \$5.00; Foreign, \$5.00; 50 cents per copy.

Entered as second class matter, November 30, 1944, at the Post Office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Accepted for mailing at the special rate of postage provided for under Act of March 5, 1930, under Act of February 28, 1925.

Business communications, including subscriptions and changes of address, should be addressed to The American Ecclesiastical Review, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington 17, D. C.

Please address all manuscripts and editorial correspondence to The Editor, The American Ecclesiastical Review, The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

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
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THE RELIGIOUS ULTIMATES OF JUSTICE HOLMES

There are still some among us who speak of ours as a Christian country. Founded by men seeking "freedom to worship God," by men who wrote into our Declaration of Independence and into our Constitution a declaration of dependence upon God and of rights God-given, ours is still called a Covenant nation.¹ This despite the fact that scarcely half of our population have even nominal membership in any church. Despite, too, what Canon Bernard Iddings Bell calls our "Infantile notions about deity: devotional techniques which rarely go beyond: 'Now I lay me down to sleep' and 'God bless papa and mama.'"² The New York State Board of Regents can remind us, "Belief in a dependence upon Almighty God was the very cornerstone upon which our Founding Fathers builded."³ And Walter Lippmann can enlarge upon this concept with the impressive warning: "The liberties we talk about defending today were established by men who took their conceptions of man from the great central religious tradition of Western civilization, and the liberties we inherit can almost certainly not survive the abandonment of that tradition."⁴ But the evidence continues to accumulate that, as Canon Bell said after a generation of close observation, the mass of Americans "seem to have next to no knowledge of what Christianity is, of what it teaches about life or death or sin or redemption or God Almighty, or of what, if anything, they are supposed to do about it."⁵

Christians convinced that Christ is indeed "the way, the truth, and the life" can live their days as active participants in the political and social life about them and quite forget or remain unconscious of how ultimately isolated from the mass of their fellow citizens of all social classes they really are. Along with the rest, such Christians can "like Ike," or "keep cool with Coolidge,"

¹ *Character Guidance Discussion Topics*, U. S. Army and Air Force, Series I-IV, 1951.

² "Know How vs. Know Why," *Life*, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 97.

³ "Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools," statement of Nov. 30, 1951, quoted in *Brooklyn Tablet*, Aug. 15, 1953, p. 2.

⁴ N. Y. *Herald Tribune*, Dec. 17, 1938, quoted in *Thought*, March, 1939, p. 11 f.

⁵ "More Dogma, Please," *Atlantic Monthly*, Oct., 1938, p. 510.

or vote the straight Democratic ticket and yet seem little less than "fossils of orthodoxy," biological and cultural hangovers in the eyes of their unchurched associates. It would seem helpful for such Christians to take an occasional rough measurement of that gulf between them and their esteemed non-religious associates. The awareness of that difference may save them from a too easily assumed feeling of ultimate fellowship.

Is there some cultural landmark in modern American life from which convinced Christians can estimate their relative isolation from the better-class secularist mind? Probably the beau ideal of the secularist mind of our times in America is that of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the "Yankee from Olympus." How outstanding he is we have had described for us by his intimate associate, Felix Frankfurter: "He is a philosopher become king. . . . For centuries men to whom he will be among the great, and men who have never heard of him, 'will be moving to the measure of his thought.'"⁶ Another from the Supreme Bench, Benjamin N. Cardozo, thought Holmes the "profoundest intellect that had ever dispensed Anglo-Saxon justice."⁷ And Ross J. S. Hoffman reports of him: ". . . no man in America was the object of greater public veneration than Justice Holmes. He was idolized as the most splendid embodiment of erudition and wisdom, of courage, magnanimity, and liberality of mind. . . . Those who knew him best and whom he best loved, admired him most."⁸

Surely then the judgment passed by Holmes on Christianity and the Catholic Church should be of unusual value in indicating the distance between our religious position and that of the first-rank secularist. Fortunately we have considerable evidence of what that judgment was; evidence from his personal letters written to likeminded secularists, special intimates, whom he could thoroughly trust and with whom he could speak freely. One of those sources, the two-volume edition of the *Holmes-Pollock Letters*, has already been considerably sifted. The *Holmes-Laski Letters*, however, were published in 1953; we shall seek in them the mind of Holmes regarding the traditional philosophic background of Christianity; then Holmes' attitude towards Christ and the Church.

⁶ Clarence E. Sloane, S.J. (ed.), *Phases of American Culture* (1941), p. 79.

⁷ *Holmes-Laski Letters*, Mark DeWolfe Howe (ed.), 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), I, xiv.

⁸ *Thought*, "Holmes-Laski Letters," Autumn, 1953, pp. 446, 453.

Holmes' ultimate philosophy was one of skepticism: "we begin with a great act of faith by deciding that we are not God, i.e. that we are awake and not dreaming the world—which we never can prove."⁹ He urged as his reason for ultimate skepticism, not merely man's "tendency to self-deception," but "the fact that a change in the wind or the electrical condition will change his whole attitude toward life. Of course he can't help being serious in living and functioning, but I mean in attributing cosmic importance to his thought and believing that he is in on the ground floor with God."¹⁰ For Holmes truth meant only "that I can't help believing it—but I have no grounds for assuming that my can't helps are cosmic can't helps—and some reasons for thinking otherwise. I therefore define the truth as the system of my intellectual limitations—there being a tacit reference to what I bet is or will be the prevailing can't help of the majority of that part of the world that I count."¹¹ In further elaboration of his concept of truth Holmes described it as "the unanimous consent of mankind to a system of propositions. It is an ideal and as such postulates itself as a thing to be attained, but like other good ideals it is unattainable and therefore may be called absurd."¹² Of metaphysical reflection Holmes once said, "When I read absolute philosophy, I feel as if I were sitting alone in a shadowy room. Every once in a while a mouse skips across the floor, and I catch glimpses of him as he darts into his hole. Then a weak voice seems to say, 'Lo, I am in the bosom of God.'"¹³

Such an estimate of philosophy Holmes came to with very little knowledge of scholasticism. Despite the growing enthusiasm of his friend Harold Laski for the sixteenth century Spanish jurist-theologians (especially Suarez), whom he called "an amazing body of people whose superiority in power of analysis to Grotius is incontestable,"¹⁴ "great fellows, a little long-winded but subtle and noble-hearted,"¹⁵ Holmes remained unmoved. He remarks that Canon Sheehan shortly before his death in 1913 had given him Suarez' *De legibus* as a memento: "I thought of reading him one summer but was discouraged by the precious time it would take."¹⁶

⁹ *Holmes-Laski*, p. 211 f.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1019.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1124.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¹³ Felix Frankfurter (ed.), *Mr. Justice Holmes* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1931), p. 166.

¹⁴ *Holmes-Laski*, p. 1201.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1190.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

Holmes promises that if Laski will compile from Suarez "a volume of elegant extracts I will read it if still alive and in possession of my wits."¹⁷ But there is no evidence that he was ever given that opportunity.

If Holmes the lawyer could never take time to read Suarez concerning law, he was not likely to feel tempted to read very much of St. Thomas Aquinas. Laski's own attitude could have been a partial cause of this neglect. He began by calling "most of Aquinas simply verbal nonsense."¹⁸ Later he confessed "finding myself literally thrilled by the perverse ingenuity of his mind. I am sure that in an extra life I should devote my days to the study of medieval philosophy."¹⁹ To his credit, Laski ends by placing St. Thomas ahead of Suarez—whom he calls "straight Dominican Aquinas."²⁰ Holmes himself repeatedly refuses to concern himself with St. Thomas, saying, "I took [Morris] Cohen's word for it that I needn't read Thomas Aquinas."²¹

Regarding the dignity of human nature, Holmes is of course incurably pessimistic: "I see in myself a wave of the cosmos that is a little more phosphorescent—that carries consciousness (whatever may be the cosmic worth of consciousness)—to a little higher than the average point before it disappears. . . ." ²² Human misery can expect few tears from him: "I don't believe in the infinite importance of man—I see no reason to believe that a shudder could go through the sky if the whole ant heap were kerosened."²³ This of course in agreement with his well-known dictum: "When one thinks coldly I see no reason for attributing to man a significance different in kind from that which belongs to a baboon or to a grain of sand."²⁴

Having estimated human nature so cheaply, Holmes is contemptuous of human rights:

All my life I have sneered at the natural rights of man. . . .²⁵ You respect the rights of man—I don't, except those things a given crowd will fight for—which vary from religion to the price of a glass of beer. . . .²⁶ We look at our fellow men with sympathy but nature looks

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1193. ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 775. ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1017. ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 379.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 685. ²² *Ibid.*, p. 1266. ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

²⁴ Mark DeWolfe Howe, *Holmes-Pollock Letters*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), II, 252.

²⁵ *Holmes-Laski*, p. 21.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 948.

at them as she looks at flies—and some of her dealings are hard but should not be attributed to those who from the accident of position happen to be her instruments. . . .²⁷ When you are thoroughly convinced that you are right—wholeheartedly desire an end—and have no doubt of your power to accomplish it—I see nothing but municipal regulations to interfere with your using your power to accomplish it. The sacredness of human life is a formula that is good only inside a system of law.²⁸

With respect to the vital question of all time, "What think ye of Christ? Whose son is he?", Holmes was completely indifferent. Although he thought those words from the Cross, "Father forgive them—they know not what they do," "the biggest thing in antiquity,"²⁹ he found "very plausible" the notion that Christ was a myth: "To one who concludes from reading the story that one knows nothing certain of the sayings or character of Christ it doesn't much matter whether there was or was not a center of radiant energy in the form of a man. . . ."³⁰ "It is very interesting, although of course I don't care personally whether J. C. really lived or is the product of a Gnostic Myth."³¹

Holmes apparently was never a Christian. Of his Boston boyhood religious experience he groaned: "Oh—the ennui of those Sunday morning church bells, and hymn tunes, and the sound of the citizen's feet on the pavement—not heard on other days. I hardly have recovered from it now."³² He looked forward to final unbelief with complete satisfaction, "I am glad to remember that when I was dying after Ball's Bluff I remembered my father's saying that deathbed repentance generally meant only that the man was scared and I reflected that if I wanted to I couldn't, because I still thought the same."³³ He scoffed at the very concept of revelation:

I said to my secretary the other day (it pleased me and I'm not sure I didn't tell you): It would make me a little happier if God would come down and snuggle up to me and say, "Now I'm going to give you the real tip about the universe—and to show you I'm the genuine thing I will do a little miracle for a starter! Puff. You see you are in another world! Puff! Now you are back again. Well, the correct tip is XXX. But don't tell it for they'd lock you up as crazy."³⁴

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 946. ²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 217. ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 605. ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1061.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1224. ³² *Ibid.*, p. 154. ³³ *Ibid.* ³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1288.

Among Holmes' associates Laski was the most influential with Holmes as well as the most vocal. So great was the elderly Justice's affection for him that upon Laski's return to England Holmes wrote:

But oh, my dear lad, I shall miss you sadly. There is no other man I should miss so much. Your intellectual companionship, your suggestiveness, your encouragement and affection have enriched life to me very greatly and it will be hard not to look forward to seeing you in bodily presence. However, I shall get your letters and that will be much.³⁵

There was more than a grain of truth in Holmes' appeal to Laski: "How I wish I could have you here to tell me just what I need for salvation."³⁶ With Holmes' background, he could no doubt have been expected to show little sympathy for Christianity. But it is a fact that his positive attacks were usually provoked by Laski: "... as always I go off bank when you pull the trigger."³⁷

The following give a good example of the sort of anti-religious thing that Laski fed to his receptive friend:

I only hope that the result of restoring the pope to political sovereignty [through the Lateran Treaty] will be the old result that he will meddle again in secular affairs and ride for a fall. I am told that this is a Jesuit victory; and it bears on its face their tenets and tentacles. I agree with Voltaire that there will be no peace in the world until the last King has been strangled in the bowels of the last priest. I hope you warmly agree.³⁸

Holmes largely agreed: "I don't believe in it [clericalism] any more than you do—I think it childish. . . . At times I am a little disturbed at exhibitions of ecclesiastical power, but I have such a conviction that it is doomed that I don't care to hurry its fate."³⁹

Further evidences of the contempt for Christianity Laski continued to express with nothing but approval from Holmes: Anatole France, Laski found "unmitigatedly delightful. . . . He is exactly a twentieth-century Voltaire and his easy scepticism combined with his passion for truth and contempt for organized religion are very attractive."⁴⁰ Thought of Pascal only aroused Laski to further anti-Catholic invective:

I could write a book about him which would begin by recounting how mathematics was to take a great step forward, ethics to have

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1130.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1134.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 423.

another Spinoza, when the damned Church came along, and, as always, ruined a great mind by sacrificing balanced happiness to the morbid pleasure of meditating on damnation. If the Russians *are* persecuting the Churches (which I doubt) it is a poor little tit-for-tat for fifteen hundred years' misshaping of human character.⁴¹

Among the associates of Holmes on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice White had won his admiration as "the ablest man likely to be thought of"⁴² for that position. Despite Holmes' little inclination to pay compliments, he declared White's thinking "profound." Yet White's convinced adherence to the Catholic Church in no way weakened Holmes' conviction that Christianity was just a bad habit, largely the result of a contemptible "will to believe": "man is like all other growing things and when he has grown in a certain crevice for say twenty years you can't straighten him out without attacking his life. That is what gives the power to churches that no rational man would deem worthy of thought if he were growing free and had no past. . . ."⁴³

Despite his contempt for religion, Holmes sometimes could not well avoid some attendance at Catholic services:

This last reminds me that I have attended two Catholic funerals, where high mass was said for South American diplomats, with the mixture of awe and amazement that grown men could do such things that I always feel. . . .⁴⁴ It brings up that I recently have been thinking how rational men who have not merely accepted their environment without question can be Christians.⁴⁵

Holmes once confessed, however, in his old age: "I am not entirely insensible to the effect of church ceremonies even now—though neither they nor the patent fallacies they read from St. Paul interest me very much—but I let them run over me until the show is over."⁴⁶

While Holmes could sneer at the "will to believe" as leading into all sorts of nonsense, he left himself completely exposed to the danger of the "will to disbelieve." An example of this we have in his unquestioning acquiescence in the anti-Catholic attacks of the American lawyer-historian, Henry C. Lea, whom he thought "very instructive,"⁴⁷ to Laski's delight, the latter thinking Lea's

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1230. ⁴² *Holmes-Pollock*, I, 170. ⁴³ *Holmes-Laski*, p. 1146.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 153 f. ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 131. ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1146. ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1360.

material *grand*, although poorly arranged.⁴⁸ How uncritical are these two judgments, and how false, has been shown by the researches of the English Jesuit Herbert Thurston. Having in his young manhood ventured the opinion that ten major historical errors could be found in any ten pages of a then recently published book of Lea's, Father Thurston was challenged thirty years later by the professional anti-Catholic G. G. Coulton of Cambridge University to make good his charge. Under circumstances all arranged by Dr. Coulton, the aged priest proved fifteen such errors in the passages forced upon him. Even Dr. Coulton had to acknowledge the justice of the Thurston findings although complaining that the passages had turned out to be "particularly vulnerable."⁴⁹

Since Holmes was so contemptuous of Christianity and the Church, he was at heart little more tolerant of its adherents. Of Saint-Beauve he remarked that "when he talks as a pious Catholic he makes me want to puke—though I won't swear that it isn't my prejudice rather than his fault."⁵⁰ At his hands, Cardinal Newman fares little better: "I should have been slightly nauseated by Newman had he not been too remote for anything but curiosity."⁵¹ Sainthood itself was for him just a concentration of energies: "But I also can conceive another man's saying with equal right I would rather be Jim Hill or Rockefeller than any saint. Or I would sacrifice a million lives for empire—or if I could come out on a picture that should beat Rembrandt and Rafael I would consent never to think of morality while I lived."⁵² As for dying for one's creed: "I do despise a martyr. He is a pigheaded adherent of an inadequate idea."⁵³ To Laski, finally, Holmes makes, too, this report on Sedgwick's *Life of Loyola*: "Very well done I should think, but beyond the desirableness of not being blankly ignorant I don't care a damn for Loyola. A martyr's efficiency on postulates blindly held that today one doesn't even respect. There is something of that even in Pascal, but with Loyola it seems too childlike and childish. Loyola was a hero. Hell is full of heroes."⁵⁴

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1365.

⁴⁹ Joseph Crehan, S.J., *Father Thurston* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951), pp. 151-56.

⁵⁰ *Holmes-Laski*, p. 541.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1003.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 158.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 910.

Catholics may wonder how Holmes' friendship with the Irish Canon Sheehan of Doneraile squares with this cavalier treatment of sainthood. Holmes, a guest of Lord Castletown of Doneraile, accompanied the Lord on a courtesy visit to the Canon. Something of a correspondence sprang up, furthered by Holmes' liking for a gift volume of Sheehan's writings. But how measured was Holmes' admiration for its author we find suggested in a Holmes' letter to Pollock:

I seem to be getting a certain fame among the Catholics from the evidences of my friendship with Canon Sheehan in his life. If you ever are curious about him I thought *Under the Cedars and the Stars* a beautiful rhapsody on the seasons as he sees them in his garden. . . . His novels, while having certain merits and recommended by the Church I was told, are meant for somewhat less complex tastes than ours.⁵⁵

Because Holmes lived to the age of ninety-four, it might well be wondered whether he remained as contemptuous of religion to the end. In his letters he makes frequent reference to death; on at least two such occasions he spills the vials of his wrath upon teachings regarding hell. The following reference will suffice. To Laski he writes:

Did I mention having seen a real Catholic book for children published this century that talked about Hell just as did the preacher in Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist*? . . . It makes me sick at heart, when one thinks what automatic dolls we are, to hear poor little devils told that what they thought were good actions were bad, because they had a thought of reward or punishment and did not do it simply for Christ—and the next minute to hear a puke in an apron trying to scare them stiff with a picture of the Hell they are likely to be sent to—and yet, I suppose from the preceding, ought not to think of! . . . I don't believe men who took an active part in ordinary life could or at any rate would have invented such mean and dirty spiritual tortures.⁵⁶

It seems matter for thought that a jurist of Holmes' position and attainments could, with such profound misunderstanding of the Catholic concept of sin, with perfect self-satisfaction sit in final judgment upon its consequences.

Not only did the Justice scorn the belief in hell; he saw no grounds for believing in a future personal existence of any kind.

⁵⁵ Holmes-Pollock, I, 255.

⁵⁶ Holmes-Laski, p. 80.

One who did so believe he described as thinking "of himself as a little God over against the universe instead of a cosmic ganglion. . . ." ⁵⁷ For Holmes, life has had its reward in the assurance of the judicious that he has achieved his life's ambition. So fearful was he lest in the few years that remained he might gravely compromise his past record that he craved the title *Emeritus* ⁵⁸ rather than continue the uphill road to the end: "If I should die now before any changes in my fortune I should die happy . . . for I should feel that I got out of it before any disappointment after the extraordinary—recognition sounds too confident a word—that has come this last year—the last a really charming notice in the *California Law Review*." ⁵⁹

Thought of death came to the Justice more often after the death of his wife six years before his own:

It makes me think of the time when all life shall have perished from the earth, and tests the strength of the only comfort I know—the belief that the I know not what, if it swamps all our human ultimates, does so because it is in some unimaginable way greater than they, which are only a part of it. But I also think that our demands for satisfaction are intensified by exaggeration of the belief in the unity of ourselves and a failure to see how they change in content and contour—as is natural if consciousness is only an electric illumination of cosmic currents when they make white light. ⁶⁰

Holmes confessed that concerning life "One would like to have a glimpse of the meaning . . . but one who thinks as I do perceives that he has no right to make the demand, but should shut up and go under quietly like a good soldier." ⁶¹ In this stoic attitude he seldom weakened; perhaps the only traces are the confession that "Nowadays I say to myself so often, 'Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee.' " ⁶² Only this, and the confession that although he did not believe in hell, he was afraid of it: "Our early impressions shape our later emotional reactions and when one adds the experience of having been cocksure of things that weren't so, I can't help an occasional semi-shudder as I remember that millions of intelligent men think that I am barred from the face of God unless I change." ⁶³

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 419.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1188 f.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1180.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 738.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 153 f.

Holmes apparently "died as he had lived," in 1935. Given a Unitarian service in Washington, D. C., in a flag-draped coffin the aged skeptic was "borne to Arlington on a caisson, the muffled drums beating a slow march time. A military band played the 'Battle Hymn of the Republic'. The president stood at attention, his head bared. There was a triple volley in salute from the rifles of eight infantrymen. Taps sounded.

"'I thought he was immortal,' someone said."⁶⁴

Unfortunately, Holmes himself had never thought so. One convinced that Christ is "the way, the truth, and the life" must feel remote from one who can find his "nunc dimittis" in a "really charming notice in the *California Law Review*."

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⁶⁴ Francis Biddle, *Mr. Justice Holmes* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), p. 208.

QUODLIBETAL QUESTIONS

VII

THOUGHT AND CONDUCT

The Book of Wisdom, according to Scripture scholars, was originally written in Greek in Alexandria in the first or second century before Christ. The author shows that he is acquainted with certain Greek philosophers and their teachings. He makes use of the doctrines of Aristippus and the other Cyrenaics and of Epicurus that pleasure is the sole source of human happiness. He gives something of the doctrine of Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* and of Thrasymachus in *The Republic* on power. He writes the sole passage in Sacred Scripture in which all four cardinal virtues, so often discussed by Plato and Aristotle, are named together: "And if a man love justice, her labors have great virtues; for she teaches temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable." He has other echoes of Plato. There is a statement of the teleological proof for the existence of God, which is a Greek argument, although not exclusively Greek in origin. He is acquainted, too, with the atomism and casualism of Democritus and his school.

The author seemingly refers to the early Greek philosophers of nature, like Thales, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Heraclitus, and others, and certainly to the Stoics, when he writes of those who "have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon, to be gods that rule the world." These Greek cosmologists were right in marveling at the beauty and power of the universe, but they failed to reason from such effects to their true cause. "But all men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God: and who by these good things that are seen could not understand Him that is, neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who is the workman. . . . And if through delight in their beauty they took them to be gods, let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they. For the first author of beauty made all these things. Or if they admired their power and their effects, let them understand by them that He that made them is mightier than

they. For by the greatness and beauty of created things the creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby."

Yet the Greek philosophers of nature were not entirely blame-worthy. They searched for God and desired to find Him, although they failed in their efforts. "But yet as to these they are less to be blamed. For they perhaps err, while they are seeking God and desirous to find Him. For living among His works, they make diligent search: and they are persuaded that the things are good which are seen." Still they are at fault. They used their minds with success in studying the physical order. Why then did they not continue to use their minds correctly, so as to argue from the universe to its maker? "But then again even they are not to be pardoned. For if they were able to know so much as to make a judgment of the world, how did they not more easily find out the Lord thereof?" Here is stated what was to become a fundamental position in the Christian philosophical tradition. God is made known to us not only by His own revelation, but also by the light of natural reason. If men use their reason according to its own nature and laws, they will arrive at a natural knowledge of God's existence; if they do not use their reason correctly and thus arrive at God's existence, the fault is their own.

But for the student of philosophy the most interesting passage in the Book of Wisdom is found in the second chapter, when the author discusses not those who have failed in a search for God, but men who have deliberately rejected God. In doing this he gives a memorable instance of the relation between philosophical concepts and the conduct of life. He exposes the thoughts of certain godless men, some of whom are Gentiles and some of whom are unfaithful Jews. These men have made a covenant with death. They have rejected God. They hold that nothingness is the final lot of all things, and that death alone is completely triumphant. For them materialism is the only true explanation of things and hedonism and secularism are the only acceptable way of life. Their ideology is clear within their minds and they are able to state it in powerful phrases and striking figures of speech. Our life is brief and beset with care; it ends in death, which is irresistible and final. We did not exist before birth, nor will we exist after death. Not only is the body material, but so also is the soul, and both are equally subject to complete extinction. "For we were born by

mere chance, and after this we shall be as if we had not been; for the breath in our nostrils is smoke, and reason a spark kindled by the beating of our heart, which being put out, our body shall be turned to ashes, and our spirit shall be poured abroad as thin air, and our life shall pass away as the trace of a cloud, and shall be dispersed as a mist, which is driven away by the beams of the sun, and overpowered by the heat thereof." There is no immortality of any sort, not even that of persistence in the memory of other men. "And our name in time shall be forgotten, and no man shall have any remembrance of our works." All things are fixed and determined, and the days of our life are numbered. Once done, they are beyond recall, and there is no return of any kind from the grave. "For our time is the passing of a shadow, and there is no putting back of our end: for it is fast sealed, and no man reverses it."

These are the abstract metaphysical premises accepted by the materialists and secularists, and from them they draw precise moral conclusions. They will make pleasure their supreme good and chief concern. They will indulge themselves in every fleeting luxury, for as Isaias put the thought of others like them, they think, "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die. . . . Come, let us take wine, and be filled with drunkenness: and it shall be as today, so also tomorrow, and much more." So these secularists, Gentile and Jew in the great pagan city of Alexandria, think that they will cling to their youth and make all their life a time of play and riot. "Come, therefore, and let us enjoy the good things that are present, and let us speedily use the creatures as in youth. Let us fill ourselves with costly wine, and ointments: and let no flower of spring pass by us. Let us crown ourselves with roses, before they be withered: let no meadow escape our revelry. Let us everywhere leave tokens of our joy: for this is our portion, and this our lot."

Nor is this their entire argument. Since matter is the only reality, since everything is fixed and determined and since personal pleasure is the only real good, a further conclusion follows. It is that might alone makes right. Hence, too, whatever, or better whoever, lacks physical strength is equally lacking in value of any sort. Before the strong man armed, the weak and lowly are fit only to be destroyed. "Let us oppress the poor just man, and not spare the widow, nor honor the ancient gray hairs of the aged. But let

our strength be the law of justice : for that which is feeble is found to be of no worth." From this doctrine that matter alone is real, that life ends in defeat and nothingness at the hands of death, that pleasure is the only good, and that might alone makes right, issue the further consequences of intolerance, bitter hate, and ruthless cruelty. The hedonistic egoist will seek pleasure for himself, but he will also seek to deprive others of pleasure or to inflict pain upon them. The atheist cannot endure any belief and any practice that contradict his own, and he will destroy anyone who is different from himself. "Let us therefore lie in wait for the just man, because he is of disservice to us, and he is contrary to our works, and he upbraids us with transgressions of the law, and he divulges against us the sins of our way of life. He boasts that he has knowledge of God, and he calls himself the servant of God. He is become a censorer of our thoughts. He is grievous unto us even to behold : for his life is not like other men's, and his ways are very different. We are esteemed by him to be of base metal, and he abstains from our ways as from filthiness. He calls the latter end of the just happy, and glories that he has God for his father."

For the materialist and the hedonist there is only one completely convincing argument. It is the pragmatic test, a struggle in which one of the contending parties shows its truth by the power that enables it to defeat and destroy its opponent. So the ancient pragmatist argues : "Let us see then if his words are true, and let us prove what shall happen to him, and we shall know what his end shall be. For if the just man is the son of God, He will defend him from the hands of his enemies. Let us test him by outrages and tortures, that we may know his meekness and try his patience. Let us condemn him to a most shameful death : for he will be visited according to his words." This is the pragmatic argument in its crudest form, but it is likewise a prophecy of the Passion and death of Jesus Christ and of what countless men and women have had to endure in our own time.

Such were the thoughts and deeds of certain men in a pagan city two thousand years ago. The author of the Book of Wisdom set them down for us and left a judgment on them. "These things they thought, and were deceived : for their own malice blinded them. And they knew not the mysteries of God, nor hoped for the wages of holiness, nor esteemed the honor of holy souls. For God

created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him. But by the envy of the devil death came into the world. And they that belong to his realm experience it."

There is in this marvelous passage in the Book of Wisdom a wealth of subject matter for the reflective thinker. Some of it is found in the way in which the wicked state their case. Since they hold that everything is material, it is natural for them to express themselves by means of figures of speech. "The breath in our nostrils is smoke," "reason is a spark kindled by the beating of our heart," "our spirit shall be poured abroad as thin air," "our life shall pass away as the trace of a cloud, and shall be dispersed as a mist," which is dried up by the sun. A man's life is "the passing of a shadow," and our end is "fast sealed." Pleasures are spring flowers and roses with which we should crown ourselves before they wither. Here is the familiar substitution by the materialist and sensist in philosophy of analogies and figures of speech for rational argument and of sense images and pictures for abstract ideas and intellectual analysis.

Rarely has the necessary connection between what a man truly believes and his actual conduct been brought forth as convincingly as in verses six to twenty. When a man gives what Newman well calls a real assent in contrast to a merely notional assent to a doctrine, he will make concrete application of that doctrine in his own life. When he holds, as here, that there is nothing but matter, that he himself is nothing but a handful of dust, that there is nothing beyond the grave, and that he has therefore no supernatural destiny and no final responsibility, the hedonistic way of life will inevitably follow. The Socratic doctrine that what is of value is not mere life but the good life will be scorned, and the life of pleasure and power will be regarded as the only truly human life. Personal pleasure will be set up as the chief good; craft and power will be regarded as the final source of right. Along with the demand for a maximum of pleasure for oneself will go the infliction of pain upon others. The will to power manifests itself in an attempt to destroy all that is opposed to itself and especially all that it thinks is weaker than itself. So it was in a Greek city in ancient Egypt, and so it is in modern Europe and Asia.

The contradictions that are inherent in every erroneous doctrine are seen here. The Alexandrian hedonists cannot be consistent

either within their own thought or in their conduct. They must choose between different courses of action, even if they are led by their own tenets to reject anything as supermaterial as free choice. They must recognize the distinction between what is really good and what is truly evil. They see that some men are just and good. When a just man denounces the life of mere power and pleasure as sinful, trifling, and filthy, the hedonists know that he is right. The just man cannot be answered by any appeal to reason; he must be refuted and silenced by torture and death. The necessary connection between a good will and good reasoning is likewise brought out. The ancient atheists "reasoned within themselves but not right." They were sinful men who could not see the truth, but fell into new errors and further sins because "their own malice blinded them." Two thousand years have passed since the Alexandrian atheists thought and worked, but the principles of metaphysics, psychology, and ethics that *Wisdom* states survive unchanged and facts that it notes recur today. The rejection of God leads inevitably to the assertion that to this world alone belong the kingdom, the power, and the glory. Lust, hatred, force, and cruelty must rule in such a realm. The final judgment upon it is one of inexorable despair, for in thought and fact it can end only in defeat and death.

MARKS OF THE CHURCH

Of the chief marks that distinguish the true Church—unity, holiness, universality, and apostolicity—one points to a historical fact, one to the Church's mode of existence in time and place, one to its moral and spiritual character, and one to a transcendental attribute of its being. Each of the four marks may be said to display a different aspect of the cause-effect relationship. The Church has the mark of apostolicity because of the manner in which its efficient cause brought it into existence. Jesus Christ founded His Church upon the apostles. It was His will that the Church should always be governed by the lawful successors of the apostles and that the successor of St. Peter should rule over it as Vicar of Christ and visible head of His Church. Likewise by reason of its efficient cause, the Church has the mark of universality, for Jesus Christ imposed upon it the obligation to teach all nations. From the very beginning down to the present day, it has never failed to carry out this divine command. It has the promise of the Son of

God that it will endure to the end of time, and that it will continue to preach the gospel to the whole world. Catholicity may also be described in causal terms as a property that issues from the essence of the true religion. For the Church is the congregation of all baptized persons, united in the same true faith, the same sacrifice, and the same sacraments, under the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff and the bishops in communion with him. By the very nature of the one true religion, and also by reason of the unity of the human race, the Church must be universal. It has been established for all men, and all men are ordained to it. Catholicity is therefore a property of the Church of Christ, something that issues from the very substance and constitution of the Church and is thus an effect displaying the nature of the cause that produces it.

The Church's holiness derives from its founder, Jesus Christ, the second person of the Blessed Trinity, who became man and offered His life for the salvation of the human race. He who is all-holy brought the Church into existence, and it is therefore holy as well as catholic and apostolic by reason of its efficient cause. It is likewise holy by reason of the effects that it produces, for it sets men free from sin and engenders in their souls the life of sanctifying grace. It is holy because of the heroic virtues of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, of St. Joseph, her most chaste spouse, of Sts. Peter and Paul and the other apostles, and of all the countless holy men and women, named or unknown, who have lived and died in imitation of Christ. It is holy because of its spiritual treasury, made up of the infinite merits of Jesus Christ, true God and true man, and the superabundant merits of His Virgin Mother and of the saints. It is holy because of the means given to it for the sanctification of souls, and these instrumental causes include the doctrines revealed to it by God. It is holy because these revealed truths, together with truths discerned by natural reason, are kept within it unchanged and incorrupt and are unerringly taught by it to the world. It is holy because of the sacrifice of the Mass and the sacraments, and because of its prayers and devotions and sacramentals. Holiness is a mark of the Church both in essence and in operation. To produce holiness in its subjects, that is, to bring about the sanctification and salvation of souls, is the Church's final cause, the purpose for which it has been instituted by Christ.

Among the four chief marks of the Church unity holds an especial place. The Church is a living institution: it is the mystical body of Christ. As such, it illustrates in a most compelling way the metaphysical principle, *Omne ens est unum, verum, bonum, in quantum est ens*. Inasmuch as the Church is a real being, it possesses unity, truth, and goodness. Its goodness and truth are of that superlative degree which is named holiness. Its unity is likewise complete, and it is made manifest in many ways. It is one because of the will and words of its Founder. Christ did not say that He would establish a plurality of churches, differing in perfection, authority, and function. He said rather that upon the rock of Peter He would build His Church, and that there would be but one fold and one shepherd. Christ's Church is one because He willed that all its members must profess the same faith, partake of the same sacrifice and of the same sacraments, and be united under one and the same visible head. The marks of holiness, universality, and apostolicity are necessarily involved in the unity of the Church, and when we testify to them, we testify to its unity as well.

The unity of the Church shows itself by the inner consistency of its doctrines, for systematic coherence is an effect of truth and unity and not their cause. Since the Church is a perfect society, founded and guided by Him who can neither deceive nor be deceived, all its particular teachings are in harmony with one another and constitute a unified body of doctrine. So complete is this inner unity that no single dogma can be rejected without an ensuing rejection of the whole. To say that the Church teaches an erroneous doctrine is in effect to reject the entire Church and all its teaching authority. It may take years and centuries for this rejection to become complete, formal, and explicit, but total repudiation is involved in the denial of a single essential teaching of the Church. This thesis may be documented by an appeal to modern religious history. For in the past four hundred years modern heresy has proceeded inexorably on its path to doctrinal nihilism. Such nihilistic rejection of all revealed doctrine, and along with it of much natural moral truth as well, is entailed by the rejection of any part of the unified body of dogmatic truth.

The Church's unity is revealed by the way in which it works as a living institution. The more perfectly each part in a complex

whole is adapted to every other part, the better will they work together and achieve the thing's purpose. Thus in the case of a machine; thus also in the case of a human being. Conversely, the more smoothly and successfully a thing works, the more clearly can we perceive its unity and the inner harmony of its parts. Thus it is in the Church. The Church works well. It has been successful in every age, in every part of the world, and with the most diverse types, social groups, and races. It has survived against the most fearful odds. Such vital strength is a proof of that unity which belongs to the Church because of its one founder, its one supreme visible head, its one faith, its one moral law, its one sacrifice, and its one great final goal.

Since unity is so great a mark of the true Church, it will manifest itself in other ways. The apostolicity of the Church is not of itself immediately apparent, and men may sometimes fail to perceive its universality. There are many opponents of the Catholic Church who deny that it is holy; some because they do not understand what genuine holiness is, others because they cannot or will not see that holiness actually belongs to the Church. But almost every opponent has a perception of the Church's unity and unicity. Sometimes this can even lead them to make unreasonable demands and unjustified charges. They will attack the Church because of social abuses or individual misdeeds in bygone centuries, thus bearing witness to the enduring life of the Church. Or they will hold against the entire Church some real or fancied wrong done by individual Catholics in a distant land, and so also reveal their recognition that the Church is one. All this is in contrast to a refusal to accept responsibility for what fellow sectarians have done in other times and places. A perhaps unwitting but clear distinction is made between the organic unity of the Catholic Church and the atomistic structure of sectarian religions.

There is a further clear if still unwitting testimony to the unity and unicity of true religion. Heresy can take on countless shapes and forms, and its advocates can quarrel among themselves in countless ways. At the same time they will agree on at least one great point, their opposition to the Catholic Church. Apostates, heathen, and schismatics, atheists and pantheists, materialists and idealists can become allies of heresy in this attack. Communists and extreme rightists will close ranks with them against the single

foe. All these and others, too, can make common cause against the Church. Thus do they show that they recognize its unity, and to some extent its holiness, apostolicity, and universality as well. They become witnesses to the truth and divinity of the Catholic Church, and in spite of themselves their testimony to its four chief marks serves to draw other men to Christ's Church and through it to eternal life.

A CAUSAL DEFINITION

Real definitions, that is, definitions of things in contrast to definitions of words, tell us in whole or in part what things truly are. If a real definition tells us to what genus a thing belongs and also what is the specific difference that marks it off from all other classes in that genus, we then have an essential definition. For instance, man is a rational animal. Such definitions are not easy to fashion, especially for things in nature. Often the best that we can do is to give a descriptive definition, that is, to describe the thing that we are concerned with in terms of its properties and accidental characteristics. An elephant, says the Thorndike-Barnhart dictionary, is "a huge, heavy mammal, with a long trunk and ivory tusks, that is the largest four-footed animal now living." A third kind of real definition states the nature of the *definiendum* in terms of one or more of the four causes. Thus the traditional definition of a sacrament says that it is an outward sign, instituted by Christ, to give grace. Here we find all four causes, efficient, final, material, and formal. Christ is the efficient cause of the sacraments. To give grace to the soul is their purpose or final cause. They are outward signs, that is, something perceptible to the senses to which a new meaning and a new form have been attached. Here are the material and formal causes. Again, a law is an ordinance of reason, promulgated by the one who has charge over the community for the common good. Material, formal, efficient, and final causes are found also in this famous definition.

The four causes are implicit in the definition of the Catholic Church, and they can easily be made explicit. The Church instituted by Jesus Christ for the salvation of souls is the congregation of all the faithful, united in the same true faith, the same sacrifice, and the same sacraments, under the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff and the bishops in communion with him. Here are given the cause by which the Church has been brought into being, the

cause for which it has been established, and the cause out of which it has been made, namely, the human beings who make it up. The formal cause is also given, for men have been shaped and organized into the living mystical body of Christ by divine grace, faith, and authority. This definition is essential as well as causal, for it states all that is requisite for the coming into being and the continuance in being of the reality that is the Catholic Church. Even if we add the four chief marks of the Church to this definition, and describe it as one, holy, universal, and apostolic, we add nothing to it as an essential definition. The four marks derive from the four causes. They result from the existent essence that those causes have produced. They do not constitute the Church's essence, but are effects that enable men to know its existence and nature.

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MARY AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF THE MYSTICAL BODY

That there are many forms of devotion to the Blessed Virgin is attested by the many titles in the Litany of Loretto. Yet, as we consider these titles, we see that they reduce themselves to three fundamental classifications: (1) the part played by our Lady in the Redemption; (2) the personal sanctity of our Lady; and (3) our Blessed Mother as an example to the faithful in their pursuit of sanctity. Thus, for example, under the first section, we would include not only our Lady as Mother of God, but also as Mediatrix of all Graces. Under the second, we would include such prerogatives as Her Immaculate Conception and Her Assumption. Under the third, we would include such titles as Mother Most Pure, Mother Most Chaste, Queen of Confessors, Queen of Virgins, etc. All of these titles play a proper part in the relationships of our Blessed Mother to the Mystical Body of Christ.

MARY AND THE REDEMPTION

The outstanding and essential doctrine of the Mystical Body is that it is the congregation of true believers, the society which is the Church. Membership in the Church supposes a supernatural uniting with Christ.¹

The very nature of the Church, in her essence and in her marks and properties, depends upon the Redemption. Redemption, however, depends upon the human nature of Christ, upon the Hypostatic Union. Christ saved man as a priest.² Yet, Christ's priesthood depended upon His human nature, since thereby He was able to bridge the gap between God and man.³ In His Incarnation was He "... taken from among men ..." and "... appointed for men in the things pertaining to God. ..." His Incarnation, however, depends upon our Blessed Mother, since through her He properly and in every respect became man. As man, He is able, properly, to represent mankind. As God, He is able to issue infinite forgiveness as an Infinite Person. In this respect, then, is His priesthood complete, proper, and unique.

¹ The requisites for membership in the Church have been listed in the encyclical *Mystici Corporis*, DB, 2286.

² Cf. the encyclical *Quas primas*, DB, 2195.

³ Cf. St. Paul, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, Chap. 5.

Though this is the work of God, it is the work of God through Mary. The necessity involving Mary is a hypothetical one since it depends upon a condition, the divine Condition of a redemption, and not a mere amnesty. Nevertheless, it is divine, and Mary exists by a divine decree and for a divine purpose. As a result, then, of a divine decree, the priesthood of Christ comes to us through Mary, and from the priesthood, Redemption. Consequently, from the point of view of our Redemption, the most decisive words ever spoken are: "Be it done unto me according to thy word."⁴

The intrinsic relationship between our Blessed Mother and Redemption does not make her one of the causes of justification, although she may be said to be the material cause of Christ's human nature. The causes of justification are clearly defined by the Council of Trent,⁵ and they are the Glory of God and the Glory of Christ, the Justice of God, the Omnipotence of God; Christ as the meritorious cause and the instrumental cause, the sacraments as secondary efficient causes. Nevertheless, even though Mary is neither a formal cause nor an efficient cause, in the divine hypothesis of the humanity of Christ, Mary is most certainly necessary.

This we see in the promise of God to Adam, in the enmity between the Woman and the serpent.⁶ This, too, we see in the promise of the virgin birth in the Prophecy of Isaias.⁷ The clearest and most express formulation of it is in the message of the Angel Gabriel to our Blessed Mother.

Similarly, we see the propriety of Mary's presence at the actual redeeming of mankind at the Crucifixion. Again, we see the propriety of Mary's presence at the activation of the Church at Pentecost. It is true that the holy women were there also, but that by reason of past services to our Lord and to the Apostles. Mary can be said to be there by right, for if anyone may be said to have a claim upon God's action in relationship to His Church, no one can be said to have a more proper and equitable claim than

⁴ *Luke*, 1: 38.

⁵ *Conc. Trid.*, Sess. VI, Chap. 7, *DB*, 799.

⁶ *Gen.* 3: 15.

⁷ *Isaias*, 7: 14; cf. *Matt.* 1: 14.

our Blessed Lady. Consequently, Mary can properly be said to be not only the Mother of God, as defined with the logic of divine action and its consequence at the Council of Ephesus, but she can also, and most properly, be said to be the Mother of the Church, the Mother of Christ's Mystical Body.

MARY'S PERSONAL SANCTITY

Our Blessed Mother's sanctification is her Immaculate Conception. This, of course, is the point of the definition of the Immaculate Conception by Pope Pius IX in the year 1854. The Immaculate Conception as Mary's own and peculiar sanctification avoids the difficulty raised by St. Thomas⁸ concerning original sin as a mark of her human descent from Adam. The adroit reasoning of John Duns Scotus introduces the distinction that avoids the Thomistic difficulty.

The question of the priority of Mary's prerogative of being the Mother of God or of her Immaculate Conception again introduces the necessity of distinguishing. Offhand, we would consider that since her Immaculate Conception was a preparation for the Incarnation, it would be subordinated to the Divine Maternity. Yet the Incarnation was for the purpose of the Redemption, and the latter was for the sanctification of the individual. Consequently, since the sanctification of Mary is the Immaculate Conception, then the Divine Maternity and its consequent Redemption were for her own sanctification, or her Immaculate Conception and its logical consequent, the Assumption.

Undoubtedly, the fact that Mary is the Mother of God puts her in a position far higher than that of the angels and the saints. St. Thomas⁹ speaks of her possessing "... in a way an infinite dignity resulting from the infinite good which is God. . . ." Furthermore, he also tells us that "... when God chooses any persons for some work, He prepares and disposes them in such a way as to be qualified for the work for which they are chosen. . . ." ¹⁰ Yet, this has to do with our Blessed Mother's place in the heavenly hierarchy, the result of a Divine Choice. When we raise the question of our Lady's intrinsic perfection in this honorable position, it can be nothing other than her unique sanctification, which was her

⁸ *Sum. theol.*, III, q. 27, a. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, I, q. 25, a. 6, *ad* 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, III, q. 27, a. 4.

Immaculate Conception, her unique participation in grace, now terminated in her unique possession of God. Again, as St. Thomas puts it: "It is reasonable to believe that she who brought forth the only begotten Son of the Father, full of grace and truth, received greater privileges of grace than all others."¹¹

We can scarcely separate the Immaculate Conception from the Divine Maternity. The latter implies the fulness of grace which is the former. The Immaculate Conception is the full and unique participation in grace coming to Mary from Redemption, the most intimate union of any creature with God.

MARY AND THE SANCTITY OF THE HUMAN RACE

That Mary has contributed to the sanctity of the human race is clear from the above. She is a principle of the introduction of grace into the world. This, of course, is the very foundation of true devotion to Mary, devotion based upon an appreciation of her role in Redemption, rather than upon admiration for her perfection. Nevertheless, there is the force of her example, and this is peculiarly fitting for true devotion within the Mystical Body.

Sanctity begins with God's grace and is intensified through the practice of the virtues. Furthermore, as stable and quasi-permanent principles of sanctity are the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The perfection of the interplay of the natural and supernatural in the spiritual life of man is found in the co-operation of the natural virtues, the supernatural virtues, and the gifts. Thus, the natural virtues, intellectual and moral, should be sufficient for man to live a well-controlled life. They should give some indication to man that his end is happiness in God, but as St. Thomas¹² points out, they can never give him an understanding of the nature of God, and on that ground alone they are insufficient for anything beyond an Aristotelian and stoical understanding of the moral life. This problem of the limitation of the natural virtues in themselves is intensified by the fact that man does not have a natural end.¹³ Consequently, he has need of supernatural virtues as well as of grace. There is further intensification of the problem because of the presence of original sin in the man who has not been justified, and by the remnants of original sin even in the man who has received justification.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, III, q. 27, a. 1. ¹² *Ibid.*, I, q. 1, a. 1. ¹³ *Loc. cit.*

With the infusion of first grace, however, the picture changes completely. Man's obediential potentiality to be raised to the supernatural order has been actualized, and we find a harmony and co-operation between the supernatural and the natural. Grace is a quality of the soul, affecting the soul as the form of man, and through the form, raising the whole man into the supernatural order. Thus, grace affects man physically and entitatively. The virtues modify man's intellectual faculties, his appetitive faculties, and his operational faculties. In this way, faith perfects the intellect; hope and charity, the will; and the infused moral virtues perfect man in his operations and in the proper operation and subordination of his emotions, sentiments and affections.

The gifts of the Holy Ghost enter into this as quasi-stable principles and dispositions.¹⁴ In dignity, they are lower than the theological virtues, although higher than all other virtues. Like the supernatural virtues, they co-operate with the natural virtues, but also with the supernatural virtues. They suppose the theological virtues, but they are so intimately tied up with charity, and so further directed towards God, that unlike faith and hope they remain even after the soul's possession of God. Charity remains, but faith and hope are replaced by vision and possession. Because of the aforementioned information of the gifts with charity, because also of their more direct reference to God, in the beatific vision, they contribute to the contemplation characteristic of the soul's perfect activity before God.

In the *Magnificat* we find our Lady calmly and serenely expressing her part in the greatest event to have occurred since the creation of man. She has the proper tendencies towards her own perfection, which is magnanimity, but she also expresses the proper evaluation of her part in it, realizing that this is not of her own doing, when she states that ". . . He has regarded the lowliness of His handmaid. . . ." Furthermore, although she states: ". . . henceforth all generations shall call me blessed . . ." she also adds, ". . . because He who is mighty has done great things for me, and holy is His name."¹⁵

¹⁴ For the following development, see St. Thomas' considerations of the gifts and the virtues: *Sum. theol.*, I-II, q. 168 ff; III, q. 1-170.

¹⁵ *Luke*, 1: 48, 49.

In the miracle at Cana, we see the same picture of our Blessed Mother's calmly appreciating her place and power with her Divine Son. No matter how we interpret the words: "What wouldst thou have me do, woman? My hour is not yet come . . .," the fact remains that Christ was moved through Mary's plea to anticipate His hour and to grant the miracle. Mary's humble sureness of herself is shown in her direction to the servants: "Do whatever He tells you."¹⁶

The entire purpose of the Mystical Body is the glory of God through the sanctification of the members of the Church. That means that the members must work about to intimate union with God through grace if they are to attain their end. The life of Mary is that of intimate union with God. Her physical union with her Divine Son is something like a sacrament. It was something that existed for a time. Her union with God through grace is the outstanding characteristic of her life. She always enjoyed the perfection of grace, but on the other hand, she was always most faithful to the movements of God in her soul. She represents the perfect human being, because she represents the perfection of the correspondents with grace. She has this much in common with us, that whereas grace proceeds from her Divine Son as from a source, grace existed perfectly in Mary by way of participation, the manner in which the members of the Mystical Body enjoy grace. Although the differences between Mary's perfection and the perfection of even the highest of the other saints are of an intense degree, nevertheless they are the same, insofar as they are a question of correspondence with God's will. In this respect, then, in that we are to be perfect as our Heavenly Father is perfect, it is Mary who shows us how thus to be perfect.

Mary's life is intensified in the incident of the Annunciation. Apart from any theological disputing over *praemotio physica* or *scientia media*, God knew that Mary would rise to this occasion because in His preparation for it, He has seen to it that Mary would be perfect in everything, great or small. That, too, is the sanctity that must be in the members of the Church. Like Mary, they must be perfect in small things, even apart from the question of the possibility of great things. If they are to be perfect as their

¹⁶ John, 2:1 ff.

Heavenly Father wishes them to be, they must be like Mary, in their thoughts, in their words, in all of their deeds and actions, otherwise, they are unworthy members of the Church. This sets a high norm of union with God, but perfection, of its very nature, is a high norm.

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FIFTY YEARS AGO

The leading article in *The American Ecclesiastical Review* for February, 1905, is the first of a series on "Mary and the Church Militant," the collaborate work of Fr. P. de la Rivière and E. M. Shapcote. The series is a study of the help given by Our Lady to the Church. In this initial article, centering about the infant Church, the authors state: "Mary, it is supposed, lived about fifteen years after Our Lord's Ascension, during which time she had opportunity of laying the foundations of family life, as well as the supernatural life of the Christian community." . . . Another article in the series on "The Founders of the Church in Idaho," by Fr. Cyril Van der Donckt, brings the narrative up to 1874. . . . Fr. T. Slater, S.J., writes on "Deals in Options and Futures" and contends that dealing in futures in the stock market is immoral. His arguments are based on the normal adjuncts of this form of business rather than on the intrinsic nature of the procedure. . . . Fr. P. A. Sillard, of Dublin, under the heading "A Poet-Priest of Elizabethan Times," contributes an interesting article on Fr. Robert Southwell, S.J., whom he calls "the founder of the modern English school of religious poetry." . . . Fr. F. J. Clayton, in a study on "The Spiritual Teaching of St. Augustine," especially as found in his treatise "On the Catechizing of the Unlearned," emphasizes the stress which the great Doctor placed on the virtue of charity. . . . In the *Analecta* there is a letter from the Apostolic Delegate, Archbishop Falconio, urging the faithful to be most generous in contributing to Peter's Pence, and suggesting methods whereby the contributions will be increased, such as the placing of Peter's Pence boxes in seminaries, colleges, etc. . . . An article on "Secret Societies among Catholics" in the Studies and Conferences section points out that secret societies are forbidden only in the event that they will not reveal their secrets to lawful authority.

F. J. C.

THE ANTEPENDIUM

The antependium or altar-frontal is an appendage which covers the entire front of the altar, from the lower part of the table to the predella, and from the Gospel corner to that of the Epistle side. Its material is not prescribed; any decent material will do, though usually it is similar to that of the sacred vestments. The antependium may be fastened to little hooks or buttons attached to the lower part of the table of the altar; or it may be pinned to one of the lower cloths; or it may be attached to a light wooden frame which fits tightly in the space between the table and the predella; or finally, it may be suspended on a rod fastened to hooks on the lower part of the table of the altar. It need not be blessed.

As regards its color, the antependium should regularly correspond with the color of the feast or office of the day (*Caerem. Episc.*, 1, xii, 11). In the Missal (*Rubr. Gen.*, xx) it is said this should be the case *as far as possible*. Some authors tell us the Missal does not thereby imply that one color may be used for another indifferently but rather that the more precious antependia of gold, silver, embroidered silk, etc., in colors not strictly liturgical, may be used on solemn occasions, although they do not correspond with the feast or office of the day.

However, if Benediction follows Mass or Vespers, the antependium of the color of the Mass or Vespers may be retained, provided the celebrant does not leave the sanctuary. Should Benediction be separated from Mass or Vespers and white not be the color used at Mass or Vespers, the antependium must be changed to white.

And lest we forget, as regards color, it is certain that a violet antependium may always take the place of a black one. After comparing various decrees, at least one rubricist concludes that a black antependium may always be used for a Requiem Mass, even on an altar at which the Blessed Sacrament is reserved; for when it was said that black should never be used on such an altar and the Sacred Congregation was questioned as to whether this ruling applies to churches in which the Blessed Sacrament is reserved at the main altar, or to churches which have but one altar, the Sacred Congregation replied that, in such cases, at least

the tabernacle canopy should be violet. Which means that, given such cases, the antependium may be either violet or black. This leaves us puzzled about the canopy, since it may always be white.

Wapelhorst, however, holds that a black antependium may never be used on the altar at which the Blessed Sacrament is reserved—contrary to the statement just made above—and that only white may be used when the Blessed Sacrament is exposed, even if the Mass calls for another color.

We might add here that since the Rubrics of the Missal state that the altar should be adorned with a frontal the color of the feast or office, and if one has the altar so adorned on, let us say, the feast of a martyr which requires red and then wishes to say a Mass in black, he evidently would be justified in doing so without changing the color by a rigid insistence on the literal sense of the rubrics.

The General Rubrics of the Missal say: "Altare in quo sacrosanctum Missae sacrificium celebrandum est . . . pallio ornetur coloris, quoad fieri potest, diei festo vel officio convenientis." Hence "the rubrics do not lay down an absolute rule; but say with the proverbial prudence of Rome: pallio ornetur, *quoad fieri potest*, that is, 'as far as possible,' " to quote Dom Roulin. "But where is the impossibility?" he asks. "Is there any great difficulty in having frontals, at least for all the Sundays of the year and the Holidays of Obligation?"

And right here, to be candid, we do not see why the expression "at least for all Sundays" can be used, just as we do not see why the antependium must not be used on the side altars as well as on the main altar, since, as Collins says: "The rubrics of the Roman Missal prescribe an antependium for every altar on which the holy sacrifice of the Mass is to be celebrated." Later on the same excellent author says: "The antependium is the true liturgical decoration of the altar, and it ought to be used on the main altar at least on the more solemn feasts and even on every Sunday of the year. Such is certainly the mind of the Church." Already there is apparent here a mitigation of the obligation: "On the main altar at least on the more solemn feasts and even on every Sunday."

But we forgive the authors mentioned this inconsistency, if so it may be called, or this mitigation of the General Rubrics, when we come across the recommendation of Collins for small churches

and oratories: "A church or oratory that cannot afford a full set of antependia may have one single antependium, made of gold cloth on one side, and of violet (purple) on the other. The gold cloth may stand for white, green and red. The violet (purple) will be used for violet or black vestments. If such an antependium is placed on a rod, all that is needed is to lift the rod and reverse it when required. If such is placed on a frame, all that is needed is to reverse the frame when required."

It is well to remember that while the tabernacle veil may always be white, the antependium may not be so, but must be changed as suggested above.

But suppose that it cannot be changed. Is it better to have no antependium at all than one that is not changed regularly according to the rubrics? Considering that some rubricists hold that the antependium is not strictly "*de praecepto*," that is, of obligation, just as some also hold that if the altar is sufficiently ornate the antependium may be dispensed with, we would simply say that it would indeed seem to be better to have none at all than just a white one, for instance.

Wapelhorst seems to imply that there is an obligation to use the antependium, since he says that the obligation to use it ceases if the altar is ornate, etc., but hastens to say that on more solemn feasts it would be very nice (*valde convenit*) to use one anyhow.

But then he has a paragraph which almost seems to imply that there is no obligation: "Very much to be recommended is the practice of many churches of always using an antependium of violet color when a high Mass is celebrated in violet or black color, and on the Sundays of Advent and from Septuagesima to Easter."

The antependium (which means *velum ante pendens*) should cover the base of the altar which is exposed to the view of the people. Laurence O'Connell says that the custom of using an antependium which covers only a small portion of the front of the altar has been condemned. And he cites SRC 4000. As the altar represents Christ, the altar-frontal, also called pallium or antependium, is its true decoration, being, together with the altar cloths, the clothing of the altar, so to speak. It should cover the entire front of the altar, according to Father O'Connell.

Now, that seems true enough, because a pallium means an envelope, a covering, a mantle. Yet one may wonder whether it

is not permissible to have an antependium that hangs down, let us say, over half the front of the altar, as mantles sometimes cover only a part of the body. Many churches have such altar-frontals, sometimes very beautiful and precious. The decree n. 4000 of Sept. 10, 1898, cited by Father O'Connell, is also mentioned by Cappello, who treats of that whole matter in this one sentence: "Usus apponendi altari, loco soliti antependii, parvum quoddam antependium, vulgo *Palia*, circa dimidium metri habens ex quavis parte, quod suspenditur in medio altaris, tolerari nequit." Now that thing half a meter wide each way is something quite different from a lovely cloth of gold, for instance, reaching all the way across the altar and hanging down some distance beneath the altar cloth but not reaching the floor.

To come back, in general the authors do not seem to take the antependium so seriously—and usage bears them out in this, or they adapt themselves to usage. Thus, for example, all that Adrian Fortescue in *The Ceremonies of the Roman Rite Described* (1937 edition) says of it is this: "In front of the altar hangs the frontal (antependium), usually the color of the day." Note that there is no further description, no indication that it must hang all the way down to the ground.

In the ninth edition (1936) of the *Ceremonial for the Use of the Catholic Churches in the United States of America*, a work which, we are assured, is authoritative, this is all we find, very tersely, and that on page one: "In front of the altar, the antependium of the color of the vestments. This is not strictly necessary, especially when the front of the altar is handsomely ornamented. (*Rub. Miss.*, part 1, n. xx)."

And in the famous *Matters Liturgical* by Wuest, 1947 edition, n. 74, we read: "The Antependium of the Altar, where it is used, should be of the color of the feast or Office. On the Altar on which the Blessed Sacrament is reserved, however, it is not allowed to place a black Antependium when a Requiem Mass is celebrated there. In this case the Antependium as well as the Canopy of the Altar, where it is used, should be violet. (S. R. C. 3201, 10; 3562). The Canopy is the veil outside the Tabernacle." Note the casual expression "where it is used," which seems to imply that there is no obligation of using it.

And so we could go on, no doubt, if we had more authors at hand, a bit perplexed at times to see how the authors contradict each other or give different interpretations to decrees, etc., until we begin to think that perhaps after all the prescription in the Rubrics of the Missal pertaining to the antependium is on a par with that, for instance, of the *Ritus Servandus* which says that the priest should put on the Mass vestments *supra Superpelliceum, si commodum haberi possit, alioquin sine eo.* (I, 2.)

Is it a sin not to have an antependium on the altar where Mass is celebrated? Or is it a sin to celebrate Mass at an altar where there is no antependium?

The obvious answer is No! How many sins would otherwise be committed every day throughout the Catholic world! Banish the thought! Cappello says: "Celebrare in altari quod caret pallio, vel nulla est culpa vel levis tantum; quod si altare sit marmoreum aut ex se satis ornatum, abest certe omnis culpa. Idque confirmatur consuetudine, quae, silente Sede Apostolica, pluribus in dioecesibus viget." (*De Sacramentis*, vol. 1, no. 725.) So, if we exclude scandal and contempt, either of which are unthinkable in this matter in this country, we may say that even if it were certainly a venial sin, which Cappello does not say, any good reason whatsoever, even devotion alone, or the simple absence of the antependium, would excuse from all sin.

Then why all this talk about the matter, if there is no sin? Alas! must we ever be asking "Is it a sin?" Why not ask "Is it more perfect? And do I want to be more perfect in this matter?" If so, act accordingly. "Or am I satisfied with the way things are, antependia (almost) everywhere conspicuous by their absence?" *Sapienti sat.*

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CATHOLIC POLEMIC AND DOCTRINAL ACCURACY

Quite recently Mr. James M. O'Neill, a Catholic writer already very well known as the author of *Catholicism and American Freedom*, brought out a new and highly significant volume, *Catholics in Controversy*. This latest work by Mr. O'Neill contains some interesting and occasionally enlightening comment on many issues in and manifestations of anti-Catholic polemic and activity in the contemporary American scene. It also includes some directions and rules for the proper conduct of controversy, and some exhortations to other Catholics, particularly among the laity, to join in the work of defending the Church against the charges levelled against it by its enemies.

Catholics in Controversy could have been and should have been a great asset to the Catholic people of the United States. Unfortunately, however, it contains two small sections which tend to mislead rather than to enlighten its readers. Both of these sections are contained within the same chapter of the book. In this chapter, which he has entitled "Minor Irritants and Incipient Controversies," Mr. O'Neill has given a completely inaccurate and objectionable statement about Cardinal Ottaviani's Lateran discourse and a seriously faulty description of the Church's power of jurisdiction.

It happens that incorrect teaching on both of these points is by no means restricted to the author of *Catholics in Controversy*. Hence it would appear to be a good idea to analyze what Mr. O'Neill has had to say on these two subjects.

CARDINAL OTTAVIANI'S TEACHING

Mr. O'Neill has been something less than candid in dealing with the matter of Cardinal Ottaviani's teaching on Church and state. The section of the chapter that deals with the Cardinal's doctrine is entitled "News Reports: The Misstatements of *Time* Magazine." In that section Mr. O'Neill complains vehemently about the way the weekly magazine *Time* handled the story about Cardinal Ottaviani's Lateran discourse of March 2, 1953. Yet, incorporated into and to some extent masked by that series of complaints against *Time*, is an absolutely unwarranted and completely false attack against the teaching of the distinguished Cardinal Pro-Secretary of the Holy Office.

Mr. O'Neill notes that a letter written to and published in *Time*, commenting on that magazine's story about Cardinal Ottaviani's address, "said that the cardinal's statement was 'in agreement, with the history, doctrines and practices of the Roman Catholic Church.'" Mr. O'Neill expresses his reaction to this statement in the following astounding pronouncement: "This is, of course, simply untrue, as anyone who knows the religious history of the Western world is perfectly well aware."¹

Thus, according to Mr. O'Neill, any person who is aware of the religious history of western civilization knows very well that what the Cardinal Pro-Secretary of the Holy Office taught in his address at the Lateran convocation was not in agreement with the history, the doctrines, and the practices of the Catholic Church. The assertion that the Cardinal's teaching is in agreement with what the Church has said and done in the field of Church-state relations is blandly dismissed as "simply untrue."

Actually, then, the attack against the news magazine, *Time*, in Mr. O'Neill's book, turns out to have been a disgraceful, yet comically presumptuous, rejection of the teaching set forth by Cardinal Ottaviani in his Lateran discourse. The Cardinal is by all means the best known and the most highly regarded expert in the field of public ecclesiastical law today. No other scholar in this field would ever dream of dismissing what the Cardinal had to say on any topic within this subject as simply not in agreement with the history, the doctrines, and the practices of the Catholic Church. It remained for an amateur like Mr. O'Neill to give this cavalier treatment to the Cardinal's teachings.

Oddly enough, Mr. O'Neill seems not to have any first hand acquaintance with the text of the discourse he has treated in such a summary fashion. Indeed, when he speaks of the content of that discourse, he appeals, not to the readily available text and translations, but to some comments about it, published in the July 23, 1953, number of the *New York Times*. According to Mr. O'Neill, "From the *New York Times*' reporting of the original dispatch from Spain, and from their reporting of the clarification by the Vatican spokesman, it seems perfectly clear that Cardinal Otta-

¹ James M. O'Neill, *Catholics in Controversy* (New York: McMullen Books, 1954), p. 158.

viani did not render any decision of the Church in favor of the situation in Spain as contrasted to the situation in America."² In the entire section entitled "News Reports: The Misstatements of *Time Magazine*," there is not one direct citation from the Cardinal's own text. Basically there are only three statements about the content of that discourse, two of them from "a special dispatch to the *New York Times* dated Madrid, July 9," and another from "a long story on this affair" published by that same newspaper on July 23, 1953. Mr. O'Neill makes no reference to the fact that the story from Madrid, dated July 9, 1953, was likewise published in the July 23 number of that paper.

Mr. O'Neill obviously placed great confidence in the *New York Times*' stories about Cardinal Ottaviani's discourse. As a matter of fact, one of his complaints against the magazine *Time* is that its condensation of the *New York Times*' stories misrepresented and misinterpreted these stories. On this particular point, however, the religious editor of *Time* was guiltless, and Mr. O'Neill himself misquoted and misrepresented his sources.

Obviously the literary and scholastic imperfections of *Catholics in Controversy* are not important in themselves. They are important, however, and worth pointing out, when they are seen as definitely able to harm the minds of those Catholics to whom the book may have been recommended by incautious reviewers. And the best way to indicate these deficiencies is to begin with an explanation of the background and the content of the *New York Times* articles themselves.

These articles dealt with a discourse delivered on March 2, 1953, by Cardinal Ottaviani, in the main auditorium of the Pontifical Lateran Athenaeum. The Cardinal Pro-Secretary of the Holy Office spoke that day to an academic convocation, called to celebrate the fourteenth anniversary of the election of Pope Pius XII. Present at this convocation were not only the student body of the Lateran, but also many Cardinals and Bishops.

There was good reason why Cardinal Ottaviani should have been invited to address this brilliant gathering. He was one of the outstanding alumni of the Roman Seminary, a part of the Lateran Athenaeum. For many years he had been professor of

² *Ibid.*, p. 159.

public ecclesiastical law in the Lateran's graduate school of canon law. His writings have brought him general recognition as one of the foremost authorities in this field, which can be roughly described as that of the Church's constitutional and international law. His March 2, 1953, Lateran discourse, which, incidentally, was entitled "Church and State: Some Present Problems in the Light of the Teaching of Pope Pius XII," reaffirmed some of the principles which he had set down in his famous *Institutiones iuris publici ecclesiastici* and *Compendium iuris publici ecclesiastici*. It also indicated certain deviations from those principles, and showed how these deviations are opposed to recent pontifical pronouncements, especially those of Pope Pius XII.

For one reason or another, the secular news services in Rome did not cover the Lateran convocation. No report of the Cardinal's discourse was printed by American secular newspapers while this address was still "news" in their sense of the term. That circumstance is in great measure responsible for the confusion and distortion manifested in some later comments on the Cardinal's speech.

Now it was obvious from the very outset that, despite the fact that the secular news services had not considered it newsworthy, the Cardinal's paper was extremely interesting and important from the scholarly point of view. It was an academic address, delivered by a legal expert of world-wide reputation to an institution which is his own *alma mater*, an institution within which he had taught brilliantly for many years. It was constructed so as to show the application of recent Pontifical doctrinal pronouncements to problems about Church and state which were currently being discussed in the Catholic academic world. It was magnificent in its accuracy, clarity, and timeliness.

As a result, within a few weeks, at the request of Catholic theologians and jurists throughout the world, the Cardinal issued his address in printed form. The Lateran Athenaeum itself printed the Italian text, and there were quickly made available translations into English, French, and Spanish. Incidentally, *The American Ecclesiastical Review* had the honor of publishing the first translation of the address into English. It appeared in the May, 1953, issue of this magazine.³

³ *AER*, CXXVIII 5 (May, 1953), 321-34. It is important to note that the *AER* article is a translation of a condensed text, which, however,

During the month of July, the *New York Times* decided to enter into the affair. On July 23 it published together what were in reality four distinct articles about the discourse. These were:

(1) a story from some special correspondent of the *Times*. This was headed "Madrid, July 9";

(2) a story from Rome, dated July 20;

(3) three paragraphs in square brackets incorporated into the Rome story as background material. This was material written by the editorial staff in New York;

(4) an undated story setting forth the comments of an American priest on the subject of the Cardinal's discourse. It was said merely that the priest had spoken "yesterday."

The Madrid story was written by someone whose favorite word is "circles." It starts by ascribing a reaction to the Cardinal's address in "Spanish ecclesiastical circles." According to these "circles" the Cardinal's address had conveyed the impression "that the doctrinal stand taken by the Roman Catholic Episcopacy of Spain on what it considered the duties and obligations of a Catholic state toward religion in general and the Protestant minorities in particular had been confirmed by the Vatican." According to the Madrid correspondent of the *Times*, the Spanish bishops' stand had previously "been criticized as too 'rigid' and 'quite behind the times' by some Catholic circles in the United States and France."

The *Times* correspondent seems to have been under the impression that the "Catholic circles in the United States" to which he referred were quite extensive. At any rate he described the Cardinal's Lateran address as conveying indirectly "the Vatican approval of the Spanish position and disapproval of the United States position." In other words an attitude which had been expressed "by some Catholic circles in the United States and

included every point of Catholic doctrine in the spoken discourse. Both the original spoken address and this condensation of it into article form were entitled "Church and State: Some Present Problems in the Light of the Teaching of Pope Pius XII." About the time the *AER* translation appeared, the Bookshop of the Pontifical Lateran Athenaeum published a longer text of the discourse in article form, under the title "Doveri dello stato cattolico verso la religione." This text has been translated and published in French, Spanish, and English.

France" is designated in the following paragraph of the same news story as "the United States position." The scholarly discourse by the Cardinal Pro-Secretary of the Holy Office was thus made to appear to those who were unfortunate enough to depend on the *New York Times* for their knowledge of the affair as in some way opposed to a teaching which could properly be termed "the United States position." It is difficult to see how a more complete misrepresentation could have been effected.

The same tactic of trying to influence people against the accurate presentation of Catholic doctrine set forth in the Cardinal's discourse appears again in the same paragraph. The Cardinal is described as the "pro-secretary of the Congregation of the Holy Office and author of what the Italian Episcopacy considers fundamental works on Public Ecclesiastical Law."

The Cardinal has written the two-volume *Institutiones iuris publici ecclesiastici* and the one-volume *Compendium iuris publici ecclesiastici*. His writings are considered classics by those expert in or even acquainted with the field of public ecclesiastical law throughout the entire Catholic world. For many years he taught this subject in the Lateran itself. A great number of schools of canon law use his *Institutiones* as a textbook.

Hence there was no good reason why the Madrid correspondent of the *New York Times* should have described him as the author of works which "the Italian Episcopacy considers fundamental" in their own field. The only ascertainable explanation for this strange language on the part of the writer from Madrid is a desire to influence the unwary and otherwise uninformed reader of the *Times* to consider the Cardinal's teaching something of interest to and approved by a group of non-Americans, and thus, by inference, something which Americans could be represented as opposing. There was absolutely no reason why the Italian Episcopate, as distinct from the American, the Irish, the French, or the German, should be singled out as esteeming the Cardinal's literary productions in the field of public ecclesiastical law unless, perhaps, this was a rather subtle maneuver on the part of the *Times'* correspondent to state that the Cardinal's textbooks were approved by the Primate of Italy, the Bishop of Rome.

The letter from Madrid carried still another passage obviously aimed at representing the Cardinal as opposed to teachings char-

acteristically American. According to the writer for the *New York Times*, the Cardinal "deplored the views of what he called 'liberal Catholicism,' as expressed by some United States circles inasmuch as, in his opinion, they represented a departure from the true Catholic theological path." It is interesting to note that this is one of the passages quoted by Mr. O'Neill in *Catholics in Controversy*.⁴

This passage in the *New York Times'* Madrid story is completely inaccurate and misleading. In the actual text of the Cardinal's address there is absolutely nothing to warrant that assertion made by the Madrid correspondent of the *New York Times* and copied by Mr. O'Neill. The only use of the term "*liberalismo catolico*" in the Cardinal's address is with reference to theories disapproved in a letter from the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities to the Bishops of Brazil.⁵ Incidentally, the Cardinal did not mention "liberal Catholicism" but "Catholic liberalism."

The second of the stories carried in the July 23, 1953, issue of the *New York Times* was datelined Rome, July 20. It began with the sentence which Mr. O'Neill quoted in *Catholics in Controversy*, and which he accused the editors of *Time* of mishandling.

According to the Rome story printed in the *New York Times*, "The Vatican said today that an address by Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani here, March 2, supporting the Spanish bishop's position favoring restriction of Protestant minorities in Roman Catholic countries in the face of criticism by some French and United States Catholics, was not official or semi-official but was nevertheless 'unexceptional.'" In quoting this passage, Mr. O'Neill substituted the word "unexceptionable" for "unexceptional," and omitted the quotation marks which the *New York Times* story had placed around this word.

Despite his own carelessness on this point, Mr. O'Neill was quite bitter about *Time's* handling of this statement in the *New York Times* story. According to him, "*Time* garbled the statement of the Vatican spokesman by not quoting the easily understood words 'not official nor semi-official,' but using only 'unexceptionable,' which could be easily misunderstood by the semi-literate."

⁴ Cf. O'Neill, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

⁵ Cf. *Doveri dello stato cattolico verso la religione*, p. 25.

What actually happened was that, unlike Mr. O'Neill, the *Time* writer read and understood the three explanatory paragraphs, enclosed within brackets within the New York *Times*' Rome story.

The last of these three paragraphs is extremely pertinent.

Appraised of this [the claim made in the New York *Times*' Madrid story, carried in that same issue of July 23, 1953, to the effect that some Spanish "circles" considered Cardinal Ottaviani's address an official approval of the "Spanish position"], a spokesman for Catholic critics here [obviously in the United States itself] insisted that the Cardinal had spoken only in his personal capacity, neither officially nor semi-officially. While upholding the view held in the United States on this, the Vatican statement also stressed the "unexceptionable" quality of the Cardinal's statement.

What actually happened, then, was that the New York *Times* first received this curiously twisted story from Madrid, with all of its innuendo against Cardinal Ottaviani and his teaching. The paper then contacted a priest whom it considered "a spokesman for Catholic critics here," and obtained from him the rather obvious remark that the Cardinal's Lateran address was neither official nor semi-official in character. Having thus prepared the background of a story, the editors directed one of their Rome staff to contact someone at the Vatican and to question him about the discourse and the comments about it.

The paper's designation of the statement that the Lateran discourse was neither official nor semi-official as "the view held in the United States on this" was inexcusable. Obviously no Vatican spokesman would "uphold" the manifestly unofficial character of the Lateran discourse as "the view held in the United States on this." A man would not have to be from any particular country to know that the discourse was neither a decree nor an instruction from the Holy Office.

Furthermore, it is quite clear that the New York *Times*' man did not speak to any Vatican official about "an address by Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani here, March 2, supporting the Spanish bishops' position favoring restriction of Protestant minorities in Roman Catholic countries in the face of criticism by some French and United States Catholics." No Vatican official would be naive enough to pay any attention to a question as crudely loaded as that. The long and inaccurate phrase qualifying the Cardinal's March 2

address is something placed there by the newspaper itself. It had obviously nothing to do with the Cardinal's discourse or with any Vatican official.

Some Vatican official, according to the *New York Times*' story, was asked whether or not the Cardinal's discourse was official or not. What happened, according to the commentary included in the Rome dispatch itself, was that the Vatican spokesman upheld the contention that the Cardinal's address was not an official statement. He went out of his way, however, to stress the fact that this statement was "unexceptionable."

Now the only official documents to which the Cardinal's name is signed are documents emanating from the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, the Roman Congregation within which he works as Pro-Secretary. It was obvious to anyone that the address the Cardinal delivered at the Lateran convocation on March 2, 1953, was not an act of any congregation, office, or tribunal of the Roman curia. Hence it was definitely not an official statement.

If the Vatican spokesman had really been asked whether or not this paper was "semi-official," he must have been somewhat puzzled. The only factor in Vatican life which is ordinarily designated as "semi-official" is the *Osservatore Romano* itself. The *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* is called the official Vatican organ, while the term "semi-official" is reserved for the daily paper, the *Osservatore Romano*.

The person or persons within the Vatican who spoke to the *New York Times* reporter stressed the fact that the Cardinal's teaching was "unexceptionable" and that it "was based largely on Papal texts, such as encyclicals and allocutions." As a result the first sentence of the printed story put the word "unexceptional," (most probably "unexceptionable" was meant) within quotation marks. There were no such marks around the terms "official or semi-official," since these were not attributed to the person who spoke for the Vatican. Mr. O'Neill found fault with the religious editor of *Time* because, in adapting the *New York Times* story to his own magazine, he made the statement: "Cardinal Ottaviani's speech was 'unexceptionable,' a Vatican official said, and there was certainly nothing new in it." The author of *Catholics in Controversy* claimed that "*Time* garbled the statement of the Vatican

spokesman by not quoting the easily understood words 'not official nor semi-official,' but using only 'unexceptionable,' which could be easily misunderstood by the semi-literate."⁶

Instead of complaining that both the *New York Times* and *Time* had misrepresented the Cardinal, our instructor in the art of Catholic controversy has actually blamed one of these papers because it did not misrepresent the story printed by the other, and thereby set forth a still more complete misinterpretation of this magnificently accurate discourse by the Cardinal Pro-Secretary of the Holy Office. Very few Catholic writers have placed themselves in a more unfavorable position than has Mr. O'Neill in his treatment of Cardinal Ottaviani's address.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH

Mr. O'Neill is guilty of very serious confusion, if not of actual error, in his treatment of the Catholic Church's ruling power. According to Mr. O'Neill,

He [Mr. Blanshard] must know that the Church is a teacher, not a dictator. He must know that the Catholic Church has no force with which to prevent him or me, or anyone else, from doing what we please or to punish us for what we do. The Church has only the force of its persuasion, its instruction, and the privilege of its sacraments. If anyone wishes to receive the sacraments of the Catholic Church (or a degree from Harvard University), he has to meet the requirements of the Church (or of Harvard). Neither the Church nor the university can force anyone to accept its teaching, its privileges, or its degrees.⁷

It would be difficult to find a more grossly inaccurate misinterpretation of the Church's power of jurisdiction than that set forth by Mr. O'Neill. In *Catholics in Controversy*, Mr. O'Neill completely overlooks the fact that God has given His Church the power to make laws and to issue individual precepts, imposing upon the subjects of the Church an obligation valid in His sight. By the very fact that God has constituted it as a perfect society, the Church can issue commands which men must follow, which they are obligated to follow. Disobedience to a law or precept of the Church is a sin against God Himself.

⁶ O'Neill, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

Any institution of learning can lay down conditions which applicants for degrees must accept if they hope to obtain these degrees. Such an institution, however, definitely cannot impose upon any man an objective obligation to accept either its degrees or its rulings. The Church has been empowered by God to impose real obligation upon its subjects by the issuance of its laws and its precepts.

As far as punishment is concerned, it is Catholic doctrine, set down in the Code of Canon Law, that "The Church has a constitutional and proper right, independent of any human authority, to coerce delinquents among her subjects by both spiritual and temporal penalties."⁸

The cause of the Catholic Church is seriously harmed when the faithful are led to accept teachings at variance with this or any other section of Catholic doctrine.

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⁸ Canon 2214, §1.

Answers to Questions

THE PROBLEM OF CO-EDUCATION

Question: What is the attitude of the Catholic Church toward co-education?

Answer: The official attitude of the Catholic Church toward co-education was thus expressed by Pope Pius XI, in his Encyclical on Christian education: "False also and harmful to Christian education is the so-called method of 'co-education.' This, too, by many of its supporters is founded upon naturalism and the denial of original sin; but by all upon a deplorable confusion of ideas that mistakes a leveling promiscuity and equality for the legitimate association of the sexes. . . . There is not in nature itself, which fashions the two quite different in organism, in temperament, in abilities, anything to suggest that there can be or ought to be promiscuity, and much less equality, in the training of the two sexes. . . . These principles, with due regard to time and place, must in accordance with Christian prudence be applied to all schools, particularly in the most delicate and decisive period of formation, that of adolescence" (Cf. *Five Great Encyclicals* [New York: Paulist Press, 1939], p. 56).

From this it follows that we may not propose co-education as the best form of education. The Pope stated, however, that the application of this principle should be in accordance with Christian prudence. Hence, when necessity demands it—for example, when financial conditions do not permit two schools and two distinct faculties in a parish—co-education is permissible in preference to having one sex excluded from the benefit of a Catholic education. But, in view of this papal pronouncement, Catholics should not regard this as the ideal procedure.

SERVILE WORK ON SUNDAY

Question: On a Saturday a man deliberately neglects to perform some necessary servile work, knowing that in consequence it will have to be done on Sunday. It is a work that will last four or

five hours, and hence constitutes grave matter. On Sunday morning he goes to confession and accuses himself of his neglect. May he be absolved, even though both confessor and penitent realize that the latter must perform the work on Sunday afternoon?

Answer: Even when a person places himself in a situation in which it is not possible to obey a law, he can be forgiven his sin of neglect if he is sincerely sorry for it. In such a case, since he can no longer fulfil the law, his non-observance is not a sin. Applying this to the problem presented, we conclude that the man who has neglected a considerable amount of servile work on Saturday, fully realizing that it will have to be done on Sunday, can be absolved and admitted to Holy Communion on Sunday morning, provided he truly repents of his sin of neglect, even though he foresees that he will have to do the work that afternoon. In this even the actual performance of the work is not sinful because it is now necessary work, although the negligence which rendered it necessary on Sunday was a sin.

READING A BOOK WITHOUT AN *IMPRIMATUR*

Question: Is it a sin to read a book by a priest on some religious topic which bears no *Imprimatur*, but is highly recommended by Catholic reviewers?

Answer: According to Canon 1399, §5, certain writings may not be read if they are published without the prescribed ecclesiastical approval, such as commentaries on the Sacred Scriptures, and books which strive to introduce new devotions. However, it should be noted that an author may sometimes publish a work without any indication of an *Imprimatur*, even though this has actually been granted. In this connection Bouscaren-Ellis say: "May the *imprimatur* be omitted from the book for special reasons, e.g., if it is destined for non-Catholics, who would close the book on seeing the Catholic *imprimatur*? Undoubtedly special permission from the Holy See could be obtained for such a practice. Even without special permission, Vermeersch, by a sort of *epikeia*, allowed this" (*Canon Law* [Milwaukee, 1951], p. 776).

If, however, a priest published a book without obtaining an *Imprimatur* which he should have obtained the book would not be

a forbidden book, if it did not come under any of the various categories of prohibited literature enumerated in Canon 1399. Consequently, it would not *per se* be a sin to read such a work merely because it has no ecclesiastical approval.

EXTRA STIPEND FOR BAPTISM

Question: In a certain parish of a diocese where the stipend for Baptism has been fixed as two dollars the pastor demands for this ceremony three dollars, because he is building a new church and puts the extra dollar into the fund for the erection of this edifice. Has the pastor a right to raise the stipend in this way?

Answer: It is stipulated in Canon Law (Canon 1506, §1) that the stipend to be given on the occasion of the administration of sacraments and sacramentals is to be determined by a provincial council or by the assembly of the bishops of the province, the decision being dependent on the approval of the Holy See. To demand more than this is forbidden. Canon 736 explicitly states: "For the administration of the sacraments the minister, for any cause or occasion whatsoever, may not directly or indirectly demand or request anything, except the offerings laid down in Canon 1507, §1." The pastor described by the questioner is failing against this prescription of the Church. According to Merkelbach, he is guilty of ecclesiastical simony (*Summa theologiae moralis* [Paris, 1938], II, n. 813). The fact that he is seeking funds for a most worthy cause, the erection of a new church, does not excuse him. It should be noted that even a *request* for an increased stipend, and not only a *demand* is forbidden by Church law on the occasion of the administration of the sacraments.

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.S.S.R.

THE METROPOLITAN'S CROSS

Question: What is the regulation about the Corpus of the cross facing or not facing the metropolitan when he marches in procession? I have seen it carried both ways and I wonder what is the correct procedure.

Answer: When the cross-bearer is at the head of the procession he carries the cross with Corpus facing the direction in which the procession moves. If the cross-bearer carries the metropolitan cross he comes immediately before the metropolitan archbishop and carries the cross with the image of the crucifix turned toward the metropolitan. The *Costume of Prelates* by Nainfa states specifically that the metropolitan cross should not be double-armed.

MASS ON FIRST SUNDAY OF ADVENT

Question: We opened our Forty Hours' Devotion on November 29, the first Sunday of Advent. There was great confusion about the Mass to be said. It was finally decided that the Mass of the Sunday must be said with only a commemoration of the Blessed Sacrament. Were we correct?

Answer: You were correct since the Mass, *Cibavit*, is forbidden when a public votive Mass is not permitted. Such a Mass is not allowed on the major Sundays of the first class and this includes the first Sunday of Advent, all the Sundays of Lent and Low Sunday.

REMOVABLE ALTAR CLOTH

Question: I am aware of the regulation about both altar cloth and communion plate being used at the time of the distribution of Holy Communion. Is there any legislation or objection to the removal of the cloth after Holy Mass?

Answer: The removal of the altar cloth after Holy Mass for the balance of the day is a personal matter. The law has been fulfilled regarding the distribution of Holy Communion and that is what matters. The writer readily sees why such a custom might well be invoked in certain churches.

MASS WITHOUT SERVER

Question: Has there been any recent legislation (I have heard that there have been changes) pertaining to the offering of Holy Mass without a server?

Answer: This writer knows of no recent legislation changing the law about Holy Mass without a server. Our inquirer might have reference to the statement of the Sacred Congregation of Sacraments on Oct. 1, 1949, when it was declared that there are only four reasons for celebrating Mass without a server, apart from an Apostolic Indult. They are listed as follows: (1) in order to consecrate for Viaticum; (2) in order to offer Mass for a congregation or a group of people on a day of obligation; (3) in case of an epidemic when a server cannot be secured and the priest would be obliged to abstain from celebrating Mass for a notable time; (4) when the server leaves during the Mass.

The conclusion drawn from this Instruction, *Quam plurimum*, is that one is forbidden to offer Mass merely out of devotion without a server, unless he has an indult. The Instruction likewise emphasizes the fact that requesting a woman to supply the responses in place of a regular altar boy or server requires a just cause. Some difficulty or inconvenience in securing a server must exist to justify permitting a woman to answer the prayers.

WALTER J. SCHMITZ, S.S.

Analecta

THE HOLY FATHER'S CHRISTMAS MESSAGE

"Behold I will bring upon her, as it were, a river of peace" (*Isaias* 66: 12). This promise, announced in the messianic prophecy of Isaias, was fulfilled, with mystic significance, by the Incarnate Word of God in the New Jerusalem, the Church: and We desire, beloved sons and daughters of the Catholic world, that this same promise should resound again over the entire human family as the wish of Our heart this Christmas eve.

A river of peace upon the world: this is the desire which We have most constantly cherished in Our heart, for which We have most fervently prayed and worked, ever since the day when God in His goodness was pleased to entrust to Our humble person the exalted and awe inspiring office of common father of all peoples which is proper to the vicar of Him to Whom all races are given for His inheritance (*Psalms* 2: 8).

Casting a glance backwards over the years of Our pontificate with regard to that part of Our mandate which derives from the universal fatherhood conferred upon Us, We feel that it was the intention of Divine Providence to assign to Us the particular mission of helping, by means of patient and almost exhausting toil, to lead mankind back to the paths of peace.

At the approach of the feast of Christmas each year, We would have ardently wished to be able to go to the cradle of the Prince of Peace and offer Him, as the gift He would cherish most, a mankind at peace and all united together as in one family. On the contrary We had to experience—during the first six years—the indescribable bitterness of seeing nothing all around Us but peoples in arms, carried away by the mad fury of mutual destruction.

We had hoped—and many others had hoped with Us—that once the rage of hatred and revenge had finally ceased, there would very soon have dawned a period of secure peace. Instead, there continued that agonizing state of uneasiness and danger, which public opinion described with the name "cold war" because in reality it had little or nothing in common with true peace and

had much of the character of a truce that trembled at the slightest touch. Our annual return to the cradle of the Redeemer continued to be a sad oblation of sorrows and anxieties, with an intense desire to draw therefrom the courage that was necessary in order to persist in exhorting men to peace and pointing out to them the right road to attain it.

Can We, at least now in this sixteenth year of Our pontificate, fulfill that wish? According to many reports, the cold war has slowly been replaced by a period of decreased tension between the opposing parties, as if they were giving each other a longer breathing space: and not without some irony, this decreased tension has been given the name "cold peace." While We willingly recognize that this does represent some progress in the laborious ripening of peace properly so called, nevertheless it is not yet a gift worthy of the mystery of Bethlehem, where there appeared "the goodness and kindness of God our Saviour" towards men (*Tit.* 3:4). For it is in too vivid contrast with the spirit of cordiality, of sincerity and of brightness that hovers around the cradle of the Redeemer.

In fact, in the political world, what is meant by "cold peace" if not the mere co-existence of various peoples based on fear of each other and on mutual disillusionment? Now it is clear that simple co-existence does not deserve the name of peace, to which Christian tradition, formed in the school of the lofty intellects of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, has come to apply the definition "the tranquillity of order." Cold peace is only a provisional calm, whose duration is conditional upon the changeable sensation of fear and upon the varying calculation of present strength: while it has about it nothing of true "order," which presupposes a series of relationships converging towards a common purpose that is right and just. Besides, by excluding all bonds of a spiritual nature between peoples so fragmentarily co-existing, cold peace falls far short of that which was preached and desired by the Divine Master: for His peace is founded on a union of souls in the same truth and in charity. It is defined by St. Paul as the "peace of God" which binds in the first place men's minds and hearts (*Cf. Phil.* 4:7), and it is put into practice by acts of harmonious collaboration in every field of life, not excluding the political, social and economic fields.

Such is the reason why We do not dare to offer cold peace to the Divine Infant. It is not the simple and solemn "pax" (peace) which the angels sang to the shepherds on that holy night. Much less is it the "pax Dei" (peace of God) which surpasses all understanding and is a source of interior and complete joy (Cf. *Ibid.*). It is not even that peace which mankind today dreams of and longs for after so much affliction. However, We wish to examine in detail its shortcomings, in order that from its hollow void and its uncertain duration there may be born in the rulers of nations and in those who can exercise any influence in this field, the imperative desire to transform it as soon as possible into true peace, which is, in reality, Christ Himself. For, since peace is order and order is unity, Christ alone is able and willing to unite men's minds in truth and love. It is in this sense that the Church points Him out to all peoples in the words of the prophet, as being Himself peace: "Et erit iste pax . . ." (and this man shall be our peace) (*Micheas*, 5: 5; cf. Liturgical Office for Feast of Christ the King, *passim*).

CO-EXISTENCE IN FEAR

It is a common impression, derived from the simple observation of facts, that the principal foundation on which the present state of relative calm rests, is fear. Each of the groups, into which the human family is divided, tolerates the existence of the other, because it does not wish itself to perish. By thus avoiding a fatal risk, the two groups do not live together, they co-exist. It is not a state of war, but neither is it peace: it is a cold calm. Each of the two groups smarts under the fear of the other's military and economic power. In both of them there is a grave apprehension of the catastrophic effect of the latest weapons.

Each follows with anxious attention the technical development of the other's armaments and the productive capacity of its economy, while it entrusts to its own propaganda the task of turning the other's fear to its advantage by strengthening and extending its meaning. It seems that in the field of concrete politics reliance is no longer placed on other rational or moral principles, for these, after so many delusions, have been swept away by an extreme collapse into skepticism.

The most obvious absurdity of the situation resultant from such a wretched state of affairs is this: current political practice, while dreading war as the greatest of catastrophes, at same time puts all its trust in war, as if it were the only expedient for subsistence and the only means of regulating international relations. This is, in a certain sense, placing trust in that which is loathed above all other things.

On the other hand, the above-mentioned political practice has led many, even of those responsible for government, to revise the entire problem of peace and war, and has induced them to ask themselves sincerely if deliverance from war and the ensuring of peace ought not to be sought on higher and more humane levels than on that dominated exclusively by terror. Thus it is that there has been an increase in the numbers of those who rebel against the idea of having to be satisfied with mere co-existence, of renouncing relationships of a more vital nature with the other group, and against being forced to live all the days of their lives in an atmosphere of enervating fear. Hence they have come back to consider the problem of peace and war as a fact involving a higher and Christian responsibility before God and the moral law.

Undoubtedly in this changed manner of approach to the problem there is an element of "fear" as a restraint against war and a stimulus to peace; but here the fear is that salutary fear of God—Guarantor and Vindicator of the moral law—and, therefore, as the psalmist teaches (*Ps.* 110: 10), it is the beginning of wisdom.

Once the problem is elevated to this higher plane, which alone is worthy of rational creatures, there again clearly appears the absurdity of that doctrine which held sway in the political schools of the last few decades: namely, that war is one of many admissible forms of political action, the necessary, and as it were the natural, outcome of irreconcilable disputes between two countries; and that war, therefore, is a fact bearing no relation to any kind of moral responsibility. It is likewise apparent how absurd and inadmissible is the principle—also so long accepted—according to which a ruler, who declares war, would only be guilty of having made a political error, should the war be lost. But he could in no case be accused of moral guilt and of crime for not having, when he was able to, preserved peace.

It was precisely this absurd and immoral concept of war which rendered vain, in the fatal weeks of 1939, Our efforts to uphold in both parties the will to continue negotiations. War was then thought of as a die, to be cast with greater or less caution and skill, and not as a moral fact involving obligation in conscience and higher responsibilities. It required tombs and ruins without number to reveal the true nature of war: namely, that it was not a luckier or less lucky gamble between conflicting interests but a tragedy, spiritual more than material, for millions of men; that it was not a risking of some possessions, but a loss of all: a fact of enormous gravity.

How is it possible—many at that time asked with the simplicity and truth of common sense—that, while every individual feels within himself an urgent sense of moral responsibility for his own most ordinary acts, the dreadful fact of war, which is also the fruit of the free act of somebody's will, can evade the dominion of conscience, and that there be no judge to whom its innocent victims may have recourse? In the atmosphere of that time, when people were beginning to return to common sense, widespread approval was given Our cry "war against war," with which in 1944, We declared Our opposition to the pure formalism of political action and to doctrines of war which take no account of God or of His commandments. That salutary return to common sense, instead of being weakened, became more profound and more widespread in the years of the cold war, perhaps because prolonged experience made more clearly evident the absurdity of a life lived under the incubus of fear. Thus the cold peace, with all its incoherences and uneasiness, shows signs of taking the first steps towards an authentic moral order and towards a recognition of the elevated doctrine of the Church regarding just and unjust war, and the licitness and illicitness of recourse to arms.

This goal will assuredly be attained if, on one side and the other, men will once again sincerely, almost religiously, come to consider war as an object of the moral order, whose violation constitutes in fact a culpability which will not go unpunished. In the concrete this goal will be attained if statesmen, before weighing the advantages and risks of their decisions, will recognize that they are personally subject to eternal moral laws, and will treat the problem of war as a question of conscience before God.

In the conditions of our times, there is no other way to liberate the world from its agonizing incubus except by a return to the fear of God, which in no way debases the man who willingly submits to it; rather, it saves him from the infamy of that awful crime—unnecessary war. And who can express astonishment if peace and war thus prove to be closely connected with religious truth? Everything that is, is of God: the root of all evil consists precisely in separating things from their beginning and their end.

Hence also it becomes clear that pacifist efforts or propaganda originating from those who deny all belief in God—if indeed not undertaken as an artful expedient to obtain the tactical effect of creating excitement and confusion—is always very dubious and incapable of lessening or of eliminating the anguished sense of fear.

The present co-existence in fear has thus only two possible prospects before it: either it will raise itself to a co-existence in fear of God, and thence to a truly peaceful living-together, inspired and protected by the Divine moral order: or else it will shrivel more and more into a frozen paralysis of international life, the grave dangers of which are even now foreseeable.

In fact, prolonged restraint of the natural expansion of the life of peoples can ultimately lead them to that same desperate outlet that it is desired to avoid: war. No people, furthermore, could support indefinitely a race of armaments without disastrous repercussions being felt in its normal economic development. The very agreements directed to imposing a limitation on armaments would be in vain. Without the moral foundation of fear of God, they would become, if ever reached, a source of renewed mutual distrust.

There remains, therefore, the auspicious and lightsome other way which, based upon the fear of God and aided by Him, leads to true peace, which is sincerity, warmth and life, and is thus worthy of Him Who has been given to us that men might have life in Him and have it more abundantly (Cf. *John* 10: 10).

CO-EXISTENCE IN ERROR

Although the "cold war"—and the same is true of the "cold peace"—keeps the world in a harmful state of division, yet it does not, up to the present, prevent an intense rhythm of life from pulsing therein. It is true that this is a life developing almost

exclusively in the economic field. It is however, undeniable that economics, taking advantage of the pressing progress of modern techniques, has by feverish activity attained surprising results, of such nature as to foreshadow a profound transformation in the lives of all peoples, even those heretofore considered rather backward. Admiration unquestionably cannot be withheld for what it has done and what it promises to do.

Nevertheless, economics, with its apparently unlimited ability to produce goods without number, and with the multiplicity of its relationships, exercises over many of our contemporaries a fascination superior to its potentiality, and extends to fields extraneous to economics. The error of placing such trust in modern economics is again shared in common by the two camps into which the world is today divided. In one of these, it is taught that, since man has given proof of such great power as to create the marvelous technico-economical composite of which he boasts today, he will also be able to organize the liberation of human life from all the privations and evils from which it suffers, and in this way effect a kind of self-redemption. On other hand, the conception gains ground in the opposing camp that the solution of the problem of peace must be sought in economics, and particularly in a specific form thereof, that of free exchange.

We have already had occasion at other times to expose the baselessness of such teachings. About a hundred years ago followers of the free commerce system expected wonderful things from it, attributing to it an almost magical power. One of its most ardent converts did not hesitate to compare the principle of free exchange, insofar as its effects in the moral world are concerned, with the principle of gravity which rules the physical world, and he attributed to it, as its proper effect, the drawing of men closer together, the elimination of antagonism based on race, faith, or language, and the unity of all human beings in unalterable peace (cf. Richard Cobden, *Speeches on Questions of Public Policy* [London: Macmillan and Co., 1870] I, 362-66).

The course of events has shown how deceitful is the illusion of entrusting peace to free exchange alone. Nor would the result be otherwise in the future if there were to persist that blind faith which confers on economics an imaginary mystic force. At present, moreover, there are lacking those foundations of fact which could

in any way warrant the over-rosy hopes nourished today, as in the past, by followers of this teaching. As a matter of fact, while, in one of camps which co-exist in cold peace, this highly vaunted economic freedom does not in reality yet exist, it is, in the other, completely rejected as an absurd principle. There is, between the two, a diametrical opposition in their ways of conceiving the very fundamentals of life—an opposition which cannot be reconciled by purely economic forces. Nay more, if there are—as there actually are—relations of cause and effect between the moral world and the economic world, they must be so ordered that primacy be assigned to the former; that is, the moral world which must authoritatively permeate with its spirit the social economy. Once this scale of values has been established and its actual exercise permitted, economics will, insofar as it is able, consolidate the moral world and confirm the spiritual postulates and forces of peace.

On the other hand, the economic factor might place serious obstacles in the way of peace—particularly of a cold peace, in the sense of an equilibrium between groups—if, employing erroneous systems, it were to weaken one of the groups. This could occur if, among other eventualities, individual people of one group were to engage, without consideration or regard for others, in a ceaseless increase of production, and a constant raising of their own living standard. In such a case, an upsurge of resentment and rivalry on the part of neighboring peoples would be inevitable, and consequently also the weakening of the entire group.

Prescinding from this particular consideration, however, one must be convinced that economic relationships between nations will be factors of peace insofar as they will obey the norms of natural law, will be inspired by love, will have due regard for other peoples and will be sources of help. Let it be held for certain that in relations between men, even merely economic relations, nothing is produced spontaneously—as does occur in nature which is subject to necessary laws—but everything depends substantially on the spirit. Only the spirit, the image of God and the executor of His designs, can establish order and harmony on earth, and it will succeed in doing so to the same extent that it becomes the faithful interpreter and docile instrument of the only Saviour Jesus Christ, Who is Himself Peace.

Moreover, in another matter even more delicate than that of economics, error is shared by the two camps co-existing in the cold peace: an error, namely, regarding the principles which animate their respective unity. One of the camps bases its strong internal cohesion on a false idea, an idea, moreover, violating primary human and Divine rights, yet at the same time efficacious; while the other, forgetful that it already possesses an idea that is true and has been successfully tested in the past, seems instead to be tending towards political principles which are evidently destructive of unity.

During this last decade since the war, a great yearning for spiritual renovation urged souls to unite Europe strongly, the impetus coming from the natural living conditions of her peoples, with the purpose of putting an end to the traditional rivalries between one and another, and of assuring a united protection for their independence and their peaceful development. This noble idea did not present motives for complaints or diffidence to the world outside of Europe, in the measure that this outside world was favorably disposed to Europe. It was also believed that Europe would have easily found within herself the animating idea for her unity. But the succeeding events and recent accords which, as is believed, have opened the way to a cold peace, no longer have for a basis the ideal of a more extensive European unification. Many, in fact, believe that the governing policy is for a return to a kind of nationalistic state, closed within itself, centralizing therein its forces, unsettled in its choice of alliances and, consequently, no less perilous than that which had its time of highest development during the last century.

Too soon have been forgotten the enormous mass of lives sacrificed and of goods extorted by this type of state, and the crushing economic and spiritual burdens imposed by it. But the real error consists in confusing national life in its proper sense with nationalistic politics: the first, the right and prized possession of a people, may and should be promoted: the second, as a germ infinitely harmful, will never be sufficiently repelled. National life is, in itself, that operative composite of all the values of civilization, which are proper and characteristic of a particular group, for whose spiritual unity they constitute, as it were, its bond. At the same time, it enriches, as its own contribution, the culture of all humanity.

In essence, therefore, national life is something not political; and this is confirmed by the fact that, as history and practice demonstrate, it can develop alongside of others, within the same state, just as it can also extend itself beyond the political frontiers of the same state. National life became a principle of dissolution within the community of peoples only when it began to be exploited as a means for political purposes; when, that is to say, the controlling and centralizing state made of nationality the basis of its force of expansion. Behold then the nationalistic state, the seed of rivalries and the fomenter of discord.

It is clear that, if the European community were to move forward on this road, its cohesion would become, as a result, quite weakened in comparison with that of the opposing group. Its weakness would certainly be revealed on that day of future peace destined to regulate with foresight and justice the questions still in abeyance. Nor should it be said that, in new circumstances, the dynamism of the nationalistic state no longer represents a danger for other peoples, being deprived, in the majority of cases, of effective economic and military power, for even when the dynamism of an imaginary nationalistic power is expressed in sentiment rather than exercised with actions, it is equally offensive to the mind; it feeds on distrust and breeds suspicion within alliances, impedes reciprocal understanding and thereby loyal collaboration and mutual help, to the same extent as it would if it had at its command effective force.

What would become, then, in such circumstances, of the common bond which is supposed to bind individual states in unity? What kind of a grand and efficacious idea would that be which would render them strong in defense and effective in a common program for civilization?

Some would like to see it as agreement in the rejection of that way of life destructive of liberty, proper to the other group. Without a doubt, aversion to slavery is worthy of note, but it is of negative value, and does not possess the force to stimulate the human spirit to action with the same efficacy as does a positive and absolute idea.

Such an idea, instead, could be a love of the liberty willed by God and in accord with the needs of the common good, or else

the ideal of natural law, as the foundation of an organization of the state and of states.

Only these, and like spiritual ideas, acquired now for many long centuries as part of the tradition of a Christian Europe, can sustain comparison—and moreover emerge victorious in it, to the extent that these ideas are really lived—with the false idea, though concrete and effective, which apparently holds together in cohesion, not without the aid of violence, the other group, the idea, namely, of an earthly paradise to be attained as soon as a determined form of social organization would be realized. Though illusory, this idea has succeeded in creating, at least outwardly, a compact and hardy unity, and is being accepted by the uninformed masses; it knows how to inspire its members to action and voluntarily to make sacrifices. The same idea, within the political framework which expresses it, gives to its directors a strong capacity for seduction, and to the adept the audacity to penetrate as a vanguard even into the ranks of the other side.

Europe, on the other hand, still awaits the reawakening of her own consciousness. Meanwhile, in what she stands for—such as the wisdom and organization of associated living and as an influence of culture—she seems to be losing ground in not a few regions of the earth.

Verily, such a retreat concerns the promoters of nationalistic policy, who are forced to fall back before adversaries who have taken over the same methods and made them their own. Especially among some peoples until now considered colonial, the process of organic maturation towards an autonomous polity, which Europe should have guided with perception and care, was rapidly turned into nationalistic out-breaks, greedy for power. It must be confessed that even these unforeseen eruptions, damaging to the prestige and interests of Europe, are, at least in part, the fruit of her own bad example.

Does this mean only that Europe has momentarily lost her way? In any case, that which must remain, and without doubt will remain, is the genuine Europe, that is, that composite of all the spiritual and civil values which the West has accumulated, drawing from the riches of individual nations to dispense them to the whole world. Europe, conforming to the dispositions of Divine Providence, will again be able to be the nursery and dispenser of

those values, if she will know how to resume wisely her proper spiritual character and to repudiate the divinization of power.

Just as in the past the well-springs of her strength and of her culture were eminently Christian, so now too will she have to impose on herself a return to God and to Christian ideals, if she is to find again the basis and bond of her unity and true greatness. And if these well-springs seem to be in part dried up, if this bond is threatened with rupture and the foundation of her unity crumbling, the historical and present responsibility falls back upon each of the two groups who find themselves now facing each other in anguish and mutual fear.

The motives ought to be enough for men of good will, in one and the other camp, to desire, to pray, and to act, in order that humanity may be liberated from the intoxication of power and of pre-eminence, and in order that the Spirit of God may be the Sovereign Ruler of the world, where once Almighty God chose no other means for saving those whom He loved than that of becoming a weak Babe in a poor manger. "A child is born to us, and a son is given to us, and the government is upon his shoulder" (*Isaias* 9:6; cf. *Introit*, Third Mass of Christmas Day).

CO-EXISTENCE IN TRUTH

Although it is a sad thing to note that the present rupture of the human race took place, in the beginning, between men who knew and adored the same Saviour, Jesus Christ, still there appears to Us to be a well founded hope that, in His name too, a bridge of peace may yet be built between opposing shores, and the common bond, so sadly broken, be re-established.

There is, in fact, some hope that today's co-existence may bring mankind closer to peace. In order, however, that this expectation be justified, such co-existence must in some way be co-existence in truth. Now a bridge cannot be built in truth between these two separate worlds unless it be founded on the human beings living in one and the other of these worlds, and not on their governmental or social systems. This is so because, while one of the two parties still strives in large measure, whether consciously or unconsciously, to preserve the natural law, the system prevailing in the other has completely abandoned this basis.

A one-sided supernaturalism might refuse entirely to take such an attitude into consideration, alleging the reason that we live in a redeemed world and are therefore withdrawn from the natural order; or some might say that the collectivist character of that system ought to be recognized as a "historical truth," in the sense that it too corresponds to the will of God—but these are errors to which a Catholic can by no means submit. The right road is quite different.

In both camps, there are millions in whom the imprint of Christ is preserved in a more or less active degree: they too, no less than faithful and fervent believers, should be called upon to collaborate toward a renewed basis of unity for the human race. It is true that, in one of the two camps, the voice of those who stand resolutely for truth, for love and for the spirit, is forcibly suffocated by the public authorities, while in the other people suffer from excessive timidity in proclaiming aloud their worthy desires. It is, however, the duty of a policy of unification to encourage the former and to make heard the sentiments of the latter.

Particularly in that camp where it is not a crime to oppose error, statesmen should have greater confidence in themselves: they should give proof to others of a more firm courage in foiling the maneuvers of the obscure forces which are still trying to establish power hegemonies, and they should also show more active wisdom in preserving and swelling the ranks of men of good will, especially of believers in God, who everywhere adhere in great numbers to the cause of peace.

It would certainly be an erroneous unification policy—if not actually treachery—to sacrifice in favor of nationalistic interests the racial minorities who are without strength to defend their supreme possessions; their faith and their Christian culture. Whoever were to do this would not be worthy of confidence, nor would they be acting honorably if later, in cases where their own interests demanded it, they were to invoke religious values and respect for law.

There are many who volunteer to lay the bases of human unity. Since, however, these bases, this bridge, must be of a spiritual nature, those skeptics and cynics are certainly not qualified for the task who, in accordance with doctrines of a more or less disguised materialism, reduce even the loftiest truths and the highest

spiritual values to the level of physical reactions or consider them mere ideologies.

Nor are those apt for the task who do not recognize absolute truths nor admit moral obligations in the sphere of social life. These latter have already in the past—often unknowingly, by their abuse of freedom and by their destructive and unreasonable criticism—prepared an atmosphere favorable to dictatorship and oppression; and now they push forward again to obstruct the work of social and political pacification initiated under Christian inspiration.

In some places it happens not rarely that they raise their voices against those who, conscientiously, as Christians, take a rightful active interest in political problems and in public life in general.

Now and then likewise, they disparage the assuredness and strength Christians draw from the possession of absolute truth, and on the contrary, they spread abroad the conviction that it is to modern man's honor, and redounds to the credit of his education, that he should have no determined ideas or tendencies, nor be bound to any spiritual world. Meanwhile, they forget that it was precisely from these principles that the present confusion and disorder originated, nor will they remember that it was those very Christian forces they now oppose that succeeded in restoring, in many countries, the freedom which they themselves had dissipated.

Certainly it is not upon such men that the common spiritual foundation can be laid and the bridge of truth built. Indeed, it may well be expected that, as occasion demands, they will not find it at all unseemly to be partial to the false system of the other shore, adapting themselves even to be overcome by it in case it were momentarily to triumph.

In awaiting, therefore, with confidence in the Divine mercy, that spiritual and Christian bridge, already in some way existing between the two shores, to take on a greater and more effective consistency, We would exhort primarily the Christians of the nations where the Divine gift of peace is still enjoyed to do everything possible to hasten the hour of its universal re-establishment.

Let these convince themselves, above all, that the possession of truth, if it were to remain closed within themselves, almost as if it were an object of their contemplation for deriving therefrom spiritual pleasure, would not be of service to the cause of peace;

the truth must be lived, communicated and applied to all phases of life. Also truth, and particularly Christian truth, is a talent that God placed in the hands of His servants in order that, with all that they undertake, it may bear fruit in works for the common good.

To all possessors of this truth, We would wish to propose a question, before the Eternal Judge asks it, whether they have used this talent fruitfully, in any way to be worthy of the invitation of the Master to enter into the joy of His peace. How many, perhaps even priests and lay Catholics, ought to feel remorse for having instead buried in their own hearts this and other spiritual riches, because of their own indolence and insensibility to human misery!

In particular, they would become culpable if they should tolerate that the people be left as though shepherdless, while the enemy of God, taking advantage of his powerful organization, is producing destruction in the souls not solidly enough formed in the truth. Equally responsible would the priest and laity be, if the people were not to receive and find from Christian charity in practice that active help which the Divine will prescribes. Nor would those priests and laity fulfill their obligations, were they voluntarily to close their eyes and keep silence concerning the social injustices of which they are witnesses, thus furnishing an occasion for unjust attacks against the capacity of the social action of Christianity and against the efficacy of the social doctrine of the Church, which, with the help of Divine grace, has given so many and such unquestionable public demonstrations in this regard and also in these recent decades.

In case the failure to which We have referred were to occur, it would likewise be those priests and laity who would bear the responsibility that groups of the young, and even pastors of souls, let themselves, in some cases, be won over to radicalism and erroneous progressivism.

The conduct of Christians—be they of high or humble state, or be they more or less prosperous—who would not be resolute in the recognition and observance of their own social obligations in the management of their economic affairs, would cause more grave consequences to the social order, and also to the political order. Whosoever is not ready to limit justly in relation to the common weal the use of his private goods, be it done freely according to

the dictates of his own conscience, or even done by means of organized provisions of a public character, is helping, insofar as it depends on him, to impede the indispensable primacy of personal impulse and responsibility in social life.

In democratic systems one can fall easily into such an error, when individual interest is placed under the protection of these collective organizations or of a party, where one seeks protection for the sum total of individual interests, rather than the promotion of the good of all; under such a guise the economy becomes easily subject to the power of anonymous forces which dominate it politically.

Beloved children, We are thankful to the Divine goodness for having given Us yet another opportunity to indicate to you, with paternal solicitude, the path of goodness. May the earth, abundantly watered by the Giver of true peace, be able to proclaim glory to God in the highest! "Let us go up to Bethlehem" (*Luke* 2: 15). Let us go back there close to the crib of sincerity, of truth, and of love, where the only-begotten Son of God gives Himself Man to men, in order that humanity may know again in Him its bond and its peace. "Today true peace comes down to us from Heaven" (Office of Christmas, response, second lesson). In order that the earth be worthy to receive it, We invoke upon all abounding Divine blessings.

Book Reviews

OBEDIENCE. By Various Authors (translated from the French). Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1953. Pp. viii + 289. \$3.75.

The excellent third volume in the *Religious Life* series edited by Père Plé is entitled *Obedience*. Though specifically concerned with women, as are its companion volumes, *Religious Sisters* and *Vocation*, it can be applied with equal profit to male religious. With proverbial French logic, the editor divides the book into four parts: historical, doctrinal, psychological, and experimental. In other words, he presents the problem of obedience in terms of the following questions: how did religious obedience arrive at its present form? what is this obedience objectively? what is it subjectively? and lastly, what are its pertinent applications in the training of young religious?

The work is maturely modern, both in preserving traditional wisdom and in adjusting and perfecting it. The approach to the problem is many-faceted, for among the authors are priests and nuns, superiors and subjects, representing various religious orders. Despite the multiplicity of writers, the spirit of the work is one, taking its unity from the awareness that obedience will bring forth its full fruit only if it is worked out in harmony with the human nature that grace perfects. The third part of the book, which is called "Psychological Maturity," treats the necessary reasonableness of our obediential service, and develops the key-point that Père Plé made in his short introduction. He said that, "If this giving is to have value and supernatural fecundity, it requires to be offered with an adult act, both at the very moment of taking the vows, and in the whole course of the life which flows from them." He sums up his argument in the words, "In obeying, the child of God becomes full grown." How this ideal is to be realized in the face of the prevailing difficulties and misunderstandings in the modern mind, which have been increased, no doubt, by the war, is the problem which the book solves successfully in a clear and readable way.

DAVID GRANFIELD, O.S.B.

NOTHING IS QUITE ENOUGH. By Gary MacEoin. New York: Henry Holt, 1953. Pp. v + 306. \$3.50.

Twenty years ago Gary MacEoin got the shock of his life. He had spent six years in a Redemptorist seminary in Ireland. Within three weeks of his ordination to the priesthood, he was told by his superiors that he would not be accepted for orders. After futile efforts to appeal his case to the provincial and then to Rome, Mr. MacEoin withdrew from the Congregation and eventually settled in New York where he has been gaining prominence as editor of *La Hacienda* and *Fazenda*, magazines of scientific agriculture in Spanish and Portuguese, and has authored *Cervantes* and *The Communist War on Religion*.

In *Nothing Is Quite Enough* Mr. MacEoin gives evidence that that disappointment of twenty years ago was a bitter blow, cutting deep into his soul. He reminisces about his youth, recounting his entrance into the seminary where the Novice Master was a "cold intellectual version [of spirituality] which came near postulating that everything human was wicked and to be suppressed." Mr. MacEoin waxes more warmly nostalgic recalling the glow of his mind fired by his philosophic studies. But the years of theology were mired in discomfort, "no discomfort like the lonely, dark discomfort of tossing on one's hard pailasse." These years spiraled to a climax just before the call to orders: "And years of continuous application had left us with slight reserves of physical strength. This strain now revealed itself in the development or accentuation of nervous idiosyncrasies, loss of weight, more or less neurotic ailments, insomnia, moroseness, scruples." Apparently the wound in Mr. MacEoin's soul may have healed but the trauma lingers on.

Naturally *Nothing Is Quite Enough* is Mr. MacEoin in defense of Mr. MacEoin. It is testimony that the seminary authorities never gave him a reason for their decision to deny him the priesthood. They had no canonical grounds to dismiss him from the Congregation; he had taken final vows. But heavy pressure was exerted to "encourage" him to withdraw. Mr. MacEoin remarks: "They shut me out of their interests and out of their hearts. That, I had been told, happens in the outside world; those you thought your friends and those who assumed obligations toward you let you down in a crisis. That, I had been told, one escaped in religious life, because one depended on people whose lives were guided by Christian principles."

This ferment of bitterness pervades Mr. MacEoin's book. He was enamored of philosophy. Consequently he is able to write almost ecstatically about those few years: "It was a grand life. There was a constant sense of satisfaction, of each day producing something im-

portant and each morrow crowding on to unfold its more significant secret. It was that most satisfying of human experiences, fulfillment tinged with expectancy." Satisfying too was his opportunity to help fellow students in their assignments or to teach English to priests from Europe.

But the *gaieté de coeur* quickly fades and an abrasive resentment reasserts itself. The professors were mere taskmasters, "their function performed when they had split the text book for the term into as many sections as there were classes and satisfied themselves that we had memorized each day's allotted section." The contemporary Irish cleric seemed a "boorish, half baked curate, with more facts than knowledge, more self-satisfaction than self-assurance, more words than ability to express them." Mr. MacEoin pelts away with such petards as these: "artificial affability," "islands of isolation," "ruthlessly barred," "gloom and lassitude," "colossal waste," "sloppiness," "ideal of roughness," "intellectual irresponsibility," "monotonous lip service," "wasteful use of finely tempered instruments." Thus *Nothing Is Quite Enough* has the cumulative effect of a relentless hammering, each blow swung with a resentful whack.

The title might possibly suggest that the author would admit the humble inadequacy of human nature to qualify for a lofty goal. But Mr. MacEoin admits to no such failings. He does everything but draw pictures to protest that he was one of the most talented candidates in this Redemptorist seminary.

If Mr. MacEoin's brief is unalloyed truth, then perhaps the seminary authorities acted imprudently in permitting him to approach so closely the day of ordination and then peremptorily dismissing him. But the hard fact remains that no man has a right to ordination until he is called by legitimate authority. Obviously Mr. MacEoin was never accorded that right. And even if he had been, *Nothing Is Quite Enough* merely stands as further proof that the ancients had it right the first time, *Nemo est iudex sui*.

FRANCIS X. CANFIELD

HISTORY OF ST. MEINRAD ARCHABBEY 1854-1954. By Albert Kleber, O.S.B., S.T.D., St. Meinrad, Ind., 1954, Grail Publications. Pp. xii+540. \$7.50.

A religious institution of the present size and importance of St. Meinrad Archabbey in southern Indiana cannot have existed for one hundred years in any country without having made valuable contributions to the religious and cultural heritages of that country. While its

friends from far and near gather to honor St. Meinrad Archabbey during its centenary celebrations, a happy foresight has presented to the world the highly detailed and well-documented history of the Archabbey by Father Albert Kleber, himself a member of the Archabbey household for over sixty years.

The author has employed a great wealth of firsthand sources from which to weave his account of dedicated men who gave their all to create what must remain forever a glowing chapter in the history of the Catholic Church in the United States.

Stemming from the great, thousand-year old Monastery of the Blessed Virgin Mary at Einsiedeln, Switzerland, and initiated by the ancient Benedictine missionary spirit, the St. Meinrad foundation in Indiana grew with the pioneer Church in this country. Its story can well be considered a prototype of the epic struggles made by apostolic men the length and breadth of our land to build the house of God on lasting foundations. While Father Kleber's work is limited to the areas where the St. Meinrad foundation exercised its immediate influence, his history will interest all who would know something of the men and deeds that have given us our Faith and preserved us in it since the first Cross was planted in the Americas.

The narrative flows smoothly through the facts of the founding Fathers' brave efforts to establish a Benedictine community in the wilderness. The account is well spiced with human interest vignettes and contains much general historical lore that should delight the student of American history. A profusion of details concerning the step by step growth of the foundation and its works will please those who know the Monastery and its numerous works. A general reader may find less appealing some of the extended descriptions of internal difficulties and disputes. The splendid chapter about the Community's Indian Missions work will be of lasting interest.

The truly great impact made upon American ecclesiastical life by St. Meinrad Archabbey can be comprehended from innumerable details scattered throughout Father Kleber's work. They would perhaps be more impressive if gathered together in a chapter of their own. The Monastery's contributions to higher Catholic education, the generations of worthy priests it has trained, its missionary works, its leadership in the restoration of true liturgical worship, its admirable press, and its fidelity to the prayer-life within its own walls—all these make up the substance of this *History*. They tell a story of spiritual enrichment of the Church in the United States, a story that none can read without profit and inspiration.

THOMAS E. O'CONNOR, S.S.

THE MIND OF KIERKEGAARD. By James Collins. Chicago: Regnery Company, 1953. Pp. xiv + 304. \$4.50.

The contemporary interest in the melancholy Dane, Soren Kierkegaard, is not limited to a contemporary Protestantism which has been strongly influenced by his anguish-ridden approach to Christianity; but it has also manifested itself in several competent Catholic analyses of his life and work. Guardini, Przywara, Fabro, Jolivet, and more recently, H. Roos, in a publication of a lecture given to the predominantly-Lutheran Kierkegaard Society in Copenhagen—all have either examined the man's Catholic tendencies, or considered his work from a Catholic point of view.

Dr. Collins, one of the most brilliant of the younger Thomists on the American scene, has not concerned himself specifically with the never-to-be-resolved problem of the Catholicity of Kierkegaard. He has rather presented a survey of the philosophic content of the former's thought, combining a thoroughness of exposition with a Thomistic critique. In doing so, he has written the finest work on the subject that this reviewer has encountered in English.

Dutton, incidentally, has published an English translation of Regis Jolivet's *Introduction to Kierkegaard*; and the Newman Press will issue shortly the Brackett translation of Father Roos' *Soren Kierkegaard og Katholicismen*.

To one who has read with great interest Dr. Collins' earlier studies of the Dane's critique of Hegel, and the relatively brief treatment of Kierkegaard in *The Existentialists*, this work emerges as a competent full-size portrait of the man and his thought. Perhaps the introductory section dealing with the personal life of this complex character could have been more detailed, inasmuch as the motivation of much of Kierkegaard's writing seems to lie in the various *contretemps* of his private and social life.

Kierkegaard's theory on the nature of the human individual is a particularly interesting chapter. It is also one of the most important, as Kierkegaard himself felt that the notion of man constituted "a sufficient basis for an entire philosophy of life and the world." The Lowrie and Swenson translations have popularized this concept of life in the English-speaking world. We are indebted to Dr. Collins for a work which enables us to see both the man and his theory in proper perspective.

One objection might be made to the inadequate treatment of the role of Providence in Kierkegaard's thought. Dr. Collins indeed makes it clear that Kierkegaard did not deny a meaning and purpose to history, but he does not explain the apparent absence of a Christian awareness of the implications of Providence in the man's thought.

There is an admirable precision of terminology in Dr. Collins' presentation, but one doubts that such precision is enhanced by such words as "moralontic," "passional," "othonic," "thetic," "hedonic," and "radicalization."

ROBERT PAUL MOHAN, S.S.

THE SEMINARY RULE. By Thomas Dubay, S.M. Foreword by the Most Rev. Joseph Francis Rummel. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1954. Pp. vii + 146. \$2.75.

In his preface Father Dubay states that seminarians of the type found in America in the twentieth century need an explanation for the rules that bind them. He explains that because no book on the subject was available he determined to write this volume.

The author has carried out his purpose of explaining seminary regulations in admirable fashion. After treating the moral obligation of the rule, he analyzes the various reasons why a seminarian should keep the rule (first reason: for his own personal sanctity; second reason: for the salvation of souls). He discusses at length several individual seminary regulations and the various attitudes which seminarians may adopt toward the rule.

The particular value of this book lies in its realistic approach. The author evidently knows seminarians and priests well; he appreciates the difficulties and problems of both and their relationship with one another. The problems he discusses are the actual problems met by American young men in trying to subordinate their wills to the seminary rule; the seminarians he describes are those found in American seminaries—the sincere students, the chronic complainers, the uncertain fence-sitters, the deeply spiritual ones searching for adequate spiritual direction.

Equally commendable is the author's insistence on spirituality as the basis of seminary rule-making and rule-keeping. This basic theme of a spiritual motive in keeping the rule is so ably handled that this book will be beneficial for any thinking seminarian who reads it. Even the author's digressions, e.g., into recommended study habits and conversational hints, are most practical for a seminarian.

The Seminary Rule will make excellent seminary spiritual reading and will provide any rector or spiritual director with points and viewpoints for many conferences; and for any seminarian, because of its honest realism and its spirituality, this book will be a pearl of great price.

JOHN F. WHEALON